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Abstract
De Castro, Goldin and Pereira da Silva aim at  intervals of time). Once these  controls are set,  they
contributing to understand the dispersion of returns  explain the difference between average  GDP growth
from policy  reforms using cross-country  regressions. The  rates during the country-specific  post and the pre-reform
authors compare  the "before  reform" with "after  periods, relative  to the average GDP growth of the
reform" GDP growth outcome of countries that  relevant control group.
undertook import-liberalization  and fiscal policy  The explanatory  variables in the regressions  include
reforms.  They survey  a large sample  (about 54) of  the standard growth-regression  controls. The results are
developing countries over the period 1980-99. The  the following:
benefits of openness to trade and fiscal prudence have  * With a better measurement  and timing of the policy
been extensively  identified  in the  growth literature,  but  reforms,  the growth effect  (the "returns on reform") is
the evidence from simple cross-section  analysis can  generally  smaller than in  previous papers.
sometimes be inconclusive  and remains  vulnerable to  * There is evidence of contingent relationships
criticism  on estimation  techniques,  such as identification,  between  policy and growth, corresponding to the
endogeneity, multicolinearity,  and the quality of the  country's  size, its export profile, and its governance.
data.  * Within the group of policy reformers,  some
The authors use a different  analytical  framework that  countries  have exhibited a  relatively weaker growth
establishes additional  controls.  First, they construct a  response.
counterfactual  control group. These  are countries that-  Overall, the  findings suggest that more accurate
under specific thresholds-did not introduce  policy  measurement and definition of the timing of reforms
reforms under  scrutiny.  Second,  the authors also try to  does not strengthen  the significance  of the effects  of
use the most appropriate  variable of policy reform,  for  reforms  on GDP growth.  In  fact,  the effects are weaker
example,  exogenous  changes in import-tariffs  instead of  than indicated  in most cross-section  studies. This
the endogenous  sum of all trade  flows. Third, the  suggests that the  policy implications  to be derived  from
authors try to base the before-after reform comparison  these relationships  should be treated with even more
on  the most accurate  date  for the beginning  of a policy  caution than previously thought.
reform  period  (instead of comparing averages over fixed
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Introduction and  Overview
Analyzing the Dispersion of Returns to Reform
This paper investigates why  is there such  a dispersion  in returns to policy reform  among
developing  countries  controlling  for  the  standard  growth-regression  country-specific  factors.
Pulting it differently,  why is it that some countries  have achieved  much  higher post-reform  GDP
growth rates?  When we look at the data in Table 0, the average growth  rate of the 80 developing
countries  in our sample  is slightly higher in the  1990s (3.6%) than  in the  1980s (3.2%) but one of
the most remarkable findings is that the STD of the difference 1990s-1980s  is a high 2.8%.
Except for a few early reformers,  most countries  implemented  trade liberalization  during
the  1990's.  Trade  was  not the  only  reform  front:  the  agenda  usually  included  reform  of  the
financial  domestic  sector,  capital  account  liberalization  and  fiscal  reforms  or  consolidation,  all
affecting growth  performance.  This paper estimates the effects of these policy reforms  on long-
run growth  performance.
This  paper  uses  a  different  methodology.  Most  studies  make  comparisons  between
reformers and non-reformers  over time  by conducting straighfforward  cross-country analysis that
regress  GDP growth  rates  over sets of explanatory  variables  including  the  relevant  policy one,
e.g., trade openness.  This paper adopts  a different approach  in many significant respects.  First,
this  paper  uses control  groups  (CGs).  The  control  group  is  a  set  of  countries  whose  growth
performance  will  be used as a counterfactual.  The  aim is to avoid mixing  in the comparison  the
growth  performance  of  countries  that  did  and  did  not  engage  in  policy  reforms.  We  aim  to
separate the countries that did not adopt  structural  policy reforms,  and  then examine  the cross-
country variation across those who did  reform,  in order to proceed  with statistical inference on the
policy parameters.  Second  the paper  aims  to  provide  improved  proxies of "policy  instruments".
Third,  the paper seeks to  enhance the analysis' "timing" for the beginning of reforms  and  set the
"before-after reform"  comparisons accordingly.
The  policy  reforms  that  we  consider  are  reductions  in  import  tariffs  and  fiscal
consolidation.  The  paper  is  divided  into  two  parts,  each  examining  one of these  reforms.  We
apply  the  same  methodology  in  both  cases,  although  the  fiscal  analysis  involves  additional
complexity. We recognize that we have chosen  only two sets of policy reforms  (trade  and  fiscal)
when  in practice,  structural  reform  should  include a  much wider  set of reforms,  as  well  as their
pace and  sequencing.  However,  severe data constraints at this stage limit the widening of cross-
country analysis in broader directions.
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Cross-country  regressions  of  import-liberalization  (henceforth  IL)  have  been  subject to
severe  criticism,  as  summarized  in  Rodriguez  and  Rodrik  (2000)  (RR).  Besides  criticizing the
'proliferation'  of openness indicators, they suggest promising areas of investigation  in the context
of  cross-country  studies.  We  explore  two  of  these  suggestions  regarding  the  measures  of
openness and the contingent relationships.  First,  in terms of measures of openness,  we propose
using  Average  Tariff  Rates  (ATR)  data  as  a  more  accurate  measure  of  policies  leading  to
openness  to  imports.  This  type  of data  has the  additional  characteristic  of  allowing  us  to date
import-liberalization  events,  i.e.,  defined as the time when  a permanent  reversion  in the trend of
Average Tariff Rates levels occurs. In a  sample of 73 countries we date import-liberalization,  and
identify a subset - which we name 'Control Group' - that did not experience any such reduction in
the sample period (1980 to 1999).  That data treatment allows estimating growth regressions that
explain differences in GDP growth acceleration  between 'open' countries and 'closed' ones. After
controlling  for  the  differences  in  standard  growth  determinants  between  the  two  groups,  we
evaluate  the  impact  of  import-liberalization  on  growth.  Regarding  the  second  suggestion,  we
identify  - under  the  framework  discussed  above  - some  of  the  contingent  relationships,  as
suggested in RR,  between  import-liberalization  policy and growth:  do countries  benefit differently
from  import-liberalization,  depending  on  their  comparative  advantage,  or  on  their  size?  Do
regional trade and  world trade play  a  role?  We consider  variables that capture  some of those
effects. Our results suggest that the positive effect of import liberalization  on growth  is greater for
both countries with a comparative advantage in  manufactures and higher-GDP  levels, but further
investigation is required  before results can be conclusively validated.
Overall,  our  results  suggest that  more  accurate  measurement  (Average  Tariffs  Rates)
and definition of the timing of  reforms  (date of  reversal), does not strengthen  the significance of
the effects of  import-liberalization  on GDP growth.  In fact, the effects are weaker than indicated
in most cross-section studies. This suggests that the policy implications to be derived from these
relationships should be treated with even more caution than previously has been identified.
In our analysis,  examining  fiscal  policy is a  more complex task.  Unlike  trade  policy -
which we examine in terms of import-liberalization,  fiscal performance  consists of a long vector of
components, including public investment, consumption, transfers to households, and the structure
of  the  tax  system.  Theory  suggests  that  we  look  at  specific  components  of  revenues  and
expenditures, in order to capture structural relationships between fiscal variables and productivity
and thus, growth. But examining all these dimensions in a cross-country setting would  be beyond
the  scope  of  our  resources.  Accordingly,  we  look  at  some  aggregate  measures  of  fiscal
performance.  That  leads  us  to  use  a  reduced  form  estimation,  precluding  the  estimation  of
structural  forms. Two  other problems  make  fiscal policy analysis  more  problematic  than  that of
trade: first, fiscal variables are strongly subject to endogeneity and  multicolinearity;  second, the
data is less comparable in cross-country terms then  in the case of import-tariffs.
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Despite these difficulties, we adopt the same approach  as In the case  of the IL analysis,
but  data  availability  reduces  our  sample  to  54  countries.  The  results  suggest  that  growth  is
negatively  related to  govemment consumption;  fiscal  deterioration  in  larger countries  exhibit  a
lower net  marginal cost (i.e.  a lower negative  effect on GDP  growth);  and the worse the level of
govemance, the higher is the marginal cost -in terms of GDP loss-- of a given budget deficit.
The paper is divided  into three parts: in the first part we will examine IL, and lay out the
methodology used in the paper. In the second, we examine the retums to fiscal policy. In the last,
we discuss what can be leamed from the  results of the paper and identify some limitations of our
approach.
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Part l:
The Effects of Import Liberalization on Growth
1.1  - Introduction
In this section, we estimate the effects  of Import  Liberalization  (IL) on GDP  growth  in  a
cross-section of developing countries. We innovate on the traditional cross-section analysis in two
directions:  first, we adopt a proxy for  IL which we believe  is closer to revealing the actual degree
of protection and the less inaccurate in terms of country-rankings.  Second, we adopt an modeling
strategy that  relies on  Control  Groups  (henceforth  CG),  which  consist of a set of countries  that,
according to given criteria, are regarded  as less open  to imports. These control  groups constitute
a counterfactual for comparison of growth  performance,  conditional standard  growth-determinants
in  the  lIterature.  Thus,  variables  enter the  equation  twice  differenced:  taking  advantage  of  the
data on Average  Tariff Rates (henceforth  ATR),  we are able to date  IL with  reasonable  accuracy
for most countries. Once IL is dated,  we estimate the model  in first differences of average growth
rates,  before  and  after IL.  These  first-differenced  variables  (before  versus  after  IL)  are  then
differenced with  respect to a CG,  i.e., compared  to the average  GDP growth  rates for a group  of
countries that did not undertake 'IL in the sample. The method is labeled differenced  differences,
henceforth DD '. That methodology  and the procedure for dating  IL will be discussed in the next
section.
We will be discussing the results  of two different estimation  exercises.  In the first we will
estimate the growth  regressions,  using  DD,  under a fixed IL date - set to  1990 - taken as a cut-
off  date  for  the  beginning  of  policy  reforms.  In  that  case,  the  differences  in  growth  rates
correspond  to  1990-99  averages  subtracted  from  1980-89  averages.  The  second  exercise
consists in first dating the IL on the basis of the evidence,  and then computing  twice-differenced
variables according to each country's IL date.  In this case, the CG component  or counterfactual,
will  be  different  for  each  observation  (country),  depending  on  its  respective  IL  episode.  For
example,  suppose a country liberalizes in  1986.  Differenced  growth will be the average growth in
1986-1999  minus  the average  in  1980-1985.  According  to  the  methodology  proposed,  in  both
exercises we subtract those differences from the CG differences, for all variables in the equation.
We consider alternative criteria to determine the CGs, as discussed below.
The  quality  and  suitability  of  our  data  is  subject  to  obvious  criticism:  first,  missing
observations  of  ATR  are  filled-in  by  linear  interpolation,  which  imply  measurement  errors.
1  See Ravallion et  al.  (2001) .on  how the DD  methodology  may be  used  in the  literature on  evaluation of
public policies.
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However, if we assume the path of ATR  is linear and monotonic, or,  less strongly, that deviations
from that path are i.i.d., then interpolation  will not introduce systematic bias. Given that we will be
averaging variables over  long  periods,  that problem  becomes even  less severe.  In our view,  this
assumption  does  not call for using  a different  proxy for IL,  such as  import-duties  or worse  yet,
some aggregate  ex-post indicator of openness to trade (such as the sum  of imports and exports
to  GDP).  Second,  the  irregular  number  of  years  used  to  averaging  might  introduce
heteroskedasticity  (greater variance the further the distance of IL date from  1990,  because we will
have  less  observations  in  one  of  the  periods).  In the  estimates  reported  below,  we  find  no
evidence of  heteroskedasticity,  based  on standard  econometric  tests.  Also, taking  into  account
country-specific dates allows more meaningful  coefficient estimates,  and eliminates the distortion
that arises  from  averaging from  a fixed  and common  date  for all countries.  Third,  the scope  of
ATR  is  limited,  since  it does  not  include  non-tariff  barriers  (NTB)  and  other trade  restrictions,
which may be predominant  in several countries.
The  purpose  of  dating  IL  is  to  verify  whether  the  first  results,  based  on  a  fixed  and
identical  date for all  countries  in the  sample,  will  be  corroborated  when  using  a  more accurate
measurement  of  IL policy.  If the answer  is  in the  affirmative,  then  we  will have  found  additional
evidence  the  effects  of  IL  on  growth.  Alternatively,  if  improving  measurement  reduces  the
explanatory power and the significance  of the relationship between  IL and GDP growth,  then we
will  have  an  additional  reason  to  be  skeptical  about  cross-country  studies  of  the  relationship
between openness and economic growth.
1.2 - Methodology
We present  a  brief description  of  the differenced  differences  methodology.  Begin  with a
standard production function for country i:
Ya  = F(A, Ki,  Hi,  ae't"KaH,  (1  )
After time differencing the logarithm of the function and adding an i.i.d. shock, we obtain:
Y.t  K.  H 
log  alo[  Ka1  ] + 6.log[  Hi~  t  I +  ;  + Ej  (2)
Yi.tl  Ki.,-,  Hijt_
or, in compact notation
A log y,, = aA.  log ki, + ,B.A log hi, + l9i + Ei  , i =  ,.,N  (3)
If we consider the same function for some subset of the countries  in the  sample (i.e., the
CG), we obtain:
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Alog yg,  = a.Alogkg,  +  8.Alogh., + Og + e  , g = ,...,G  N  (4)
Subtracting the two equations above and adding other terms,
Alogy,, -Alogyg,  =[9j -0g]+a.[Alogk,,  -Alogkg,]+fi.[Aloghj,  -Aloghg,]+
Molicy+Acontro1s+(e,  -eg)  ,Jig
Equation  (5)  is the basic specification  of our  model in the two parts  of this paper.  Total
Factor  Productivity  (TFP)  differential  is  a  constant,  changes  in  capital  stock  are  proxied by
investment rates  and human  capital is proxied by primary  education. The  policy vector includes
trade  and  non-trade  policy  variables:  ATR,  Government  Consumption  and  'Excess"  money
growth.  The control vector includes: a Governance  Indicator, Terms of Trade,  regional dummies,
regional trade shares and PTA-specific effects.
Excess  growth  relative  to the CG  can  be  explained  by  differences  in accumulation  of
factors of production. It also can be explained by the difference in  TFP changes (the thetas). If  we
control  for productivity  differentials  using openness to trade  (more  precisely,  to imports),  we are
implicitly assuming that  shocks that drive  productivity's process  in "open"  countries  are different
from  those in 'closed"  ones. The constant in the  regression  will  be capturing those shocks. It is
however,  impossible  to  identify  those  shocks,  in the  sense  that  other  variables,  unrelated  to
openness,  may be affecting  productivity.  Our openness  variable  (ATR)  will  be capturing  only a
marginal effect.  It is important to  stress that  we estimate  a reduced  form  equation,  since we do
not model specifically the channels through which opening to imports  affects productivity.  Indeed,
one of  the problems with  cross-sectional  estimates  is that  theory  predicts  that almost  anything
can  happen  when it comes  to  openness  and growth,  depending  on the  structural  assumptions
related  to  each  industry [see Tybout  (2000)].  In this context,  cross-country  heterogeneity  is not
enough to identify productivity effects, since it fails to incorporate industry-level characteristics.
Due to those  limitations, the  results  presented  below are merely an exploratory  analysis
of the  data,  and estimated  partial  correlations  should  not  be given any structural  interpretation.
We are estimating reduced forms.
Despite our imperfect measure of IL  and sample size limitation, we believe that our cross-
country study is valid: it examines some of the questions  raised by RR, which relate to contingent
relationships  between  trade  policy and  growth:  'Do  trade restrictions  operate  differently in low
versus  high income countries?  In small versus large countries? In  countries with a comparative
advantage  in  primaty  products  versus  those  with  a  comparative  advantage  in  manufactured
products? In periods of rapid expansion of world trade versus periods of stagnant trade?'.
The model  assumes that part of the productivity shock is attributed  to the differences in
trade  regime  [Equation  (5)].  There  is  however,  a  source  of  potential  bias  arising  from  the
page 9Relative Returns to Policy Reforn  (Castro,  Goldin and Pereira  da Silva) DRAFT
correlation  between  the  'unexplained'  part  of  productivity  shock  (the  residuals)  and  capital
accumulation.  Indeed,  if the model is not  differenced, then  certainly  E[llogkjej] ￿0  but if the
model  is  differenced,  then  there's  no  reason to  believe  E[Alogk, -Alogk8]'(e,  -E;)  * 0.  In that
sense,  we believe OLS will be an appropriate estimation method - unbiased and efficient.
The framework  above resembles  the  DD  methodology,  which is a standard  approach  in
non-experimental  evaluation  studies  [see for example,  Ravallion  (2002)].  In such  observational
studies, the assignment of treatment  to subjects (in our case, assignment of policies to countries)
is non-random.  Rosenbaum  (2002) provides a thorough treatment of this topic.2
1.3 - Data and Results
Before we discuss our results,  we briefly  review previous findings  in the  literature, so as
to  put  our  contribution  in  context.  There  are  only  a  few  studies  using  ATR  as a  measure  of
openness,  mainly  due  to  absence of  data.  Table  I summarizes  some  previous  results,  on  the
effects of trade liberalization  on economic growth.
One  noteworthy  result  is  Wacziarg  (1998).  He  estimates  the  indirect  effects  of  trade
openness  (defined as  a weighed  average  of import duties  as a percentage of  imports (ID),  NTB
coverage  and  Sachs  Warners  openness  indicator),  through  the  following  channels:  macro-
economic  policy,  FDI,  investment,  manufactured  exports,  government  consumption  and
'distortions'.
The way the  index is constructed  does not allow a meaningful  interpretation  of the total
effect of  IL  on growth  (e.g.,  a  15  %-point  reduction  in  ID corresponds  to  5.21  increase  in  the
index)
(Exports + Imports)/GDP  = -34.73*1D - 0.217*(NTB) + 11 .262*(SW)
Therefore,  given that the effect of the index on growth is 7%, then a 15-percentage point
reduction  In  ID would Increase growth  by 5.21  x 0.07 =  0.36 percentage  point per year.  If
we  consider  that  ID  underestimates  real  protection,  then  15  percentage  point  reduction  in  ID
corresponds to a greater reduction in ATR. Thus, the effect is probably larger then the above.
2  In our study, we'll be  assuming that the assignment  of treatment  (policy) is random.  One possible remedy
for non-random  assignment  is the  Propensity-Score  Method.  It estimates  using a logit  model,  conditional
probabilities of assignment to the treatment group, eliminating overt biases. Hidden bias may still be present
however.  Our DD  estimation  has some  caveats:  the treatment  is  not  a binary  variable,  and thus it is  not
constant across treatment countries (some  do more of the policy than others). Also, when we date IL, it is as
if  we were running a given experiment for subjects at different times.
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A  second  result  is  found  in  Pedroso  and  Ferreira  (2000).  They  select  an  interesting
choice of instruments for the growth  determinants,  namely,  an indicator of openness and a social
capability  index.  According  to  their  cross-section  results,  a  15  percentage-point  increase  in
openness would cause a 0.3 % increase in GDP per capita [see Table I].
Measuring  the  degree  of  openness  of  an  economy  is  tricky,  particularly  using  a  low
dimensionality  vector.  Barriers  to  imports  include  not  only tariffs,  but all sorts  of  NTB,  such as
quotas, AD duties, red-tape  in customs,  phyto-sanitary barriers,  etc..  Because we  preferably want
a  one-dimensional  indicator  of  trade  policy,  we  decided  to  use  Average  Tariff  Rates3,  non-
weighed.  A  possible  alternative  is  to  use  Import  duties  as  a  percentage  of  imports,  but  that
variable  underestimates  real  protection,  for  obvious  reasons.  More  importantly,  comparisons
across countries reveal some severe distortions,  in  terms of country rankings.
The series of Average Tariffs  is  incomplete. We use  linear interpolation to fill-in missing
values. This will cause measurement  errors  but we believe that  this variables reflects the degree
of import openness more accurately than Import Duties.
In  the  first  exercise,  we  assume  a  fixed,  common  date  for  IL  reform:  1990.  The
differences  are thus calculated as  average  in  1990-99  minus  average  in  1980-89.  We consider
three alternative  CGs:  GrouD I: countries that, on average over the period  1990-99,  had Average
Import  Tariffs  above  25%  - Pakistan,  India,  Bangladesh,  Sierra  Leone,  Sudan,  China,  Egypt,
Mauritania,  Nigeria,  Thailand,  Tunisia,  Mauritius,  Benin,  Congo  Dem.  Rep.,  Ethiopia,  Tanzania;
GrouD  11:  same set of countries  in  the CG  for the  IL-dated  regressions  (see  section  IV  below);
Group  Ill:  countries that  did  not  reduce,  or  increased  ATR  in  1990-99  compared  to  1980-89  -
Mauritania,  Zimbabwe,  Saudi Arabia,  Sierra Leone,  Libya, Congo, Tunisia,  Oman, Jordan,  Syria,
Bahrain,  Paraguay,  Israel, Singapore,  Senegal,  Malawi and Poland.
We  find  it  inappropriate  to  use  indices  that  attempt  to  measure  the  quality  of
macroeconomic  policy,  such  as  that  proposed  by  Wacziarg  (1998)  or  indices  that  attempt  to
measure  openness (such  as Sachs Warners' or Dollar's - see Table  I). RR provide reasons not
to use them.  These  which are  particularly compelling  in the  case of  openness measures.  In the
case of the quality of macro  policy the resulting  country rankings  are not  in  our view sufficiently
robust to provide illuminating  interpretation of the results.
3 The  data is extracted  from  a compilation  found at  htto://wwwl.worldbank.org/wbieo/trade/TR  Data.html.
The  primary  sources  include: WTO,  IDB  CD  ROM  database  and  Trade  Policy  Review -- Country  Report,
Various  issues,  1990-2000;  UNCTAD,  Handbook of  Trade  Control  Measures  of Developing  Countries  --
Supplement,  1987 and  Directory of Import  Regimes,  1994;  World  Bank, Trade Policy Reform in Developing
Countries  since  1985,  WB  Discussion  Paper  #267,  1994,  The  Uruguay  Round:  Statistics  on  Tariffs
Concessions  Given and Received,  1996 and World  Development  Indicators,  1998-00;  OECD,  Indicators  of
Tariff and Non-Tariff Trade Barriers,  1996; IDB,  Statistics and Quantitative Analysis data, 1998.
The data was recently published  in  the Appendix of the WB's  'Development,  Trade and the WTO - A
Handbook', WB (2002).
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'Policy'  variables  such  as  Black  Market  Premium  (BMP)  or  Ratio of  External  Debt  to
Exports listed above suffer from endogeneity with  respect to output. As RR  suggest, BMP reflects
macroeconomic conditions broadly speaking, and have little to do with openness to trade or trade
policies. They show that  BMP  is significantly correlated with  inflation, debt to exports ratio and to
quality of institutions. Indeed,  the correlation matrices  presented below are consistent with these
conclusions,  in  that  BMP  is  highly and  negatively  correlated  with  govemance  measures  and
positively correlated with variance of terms of trade  (TOT), in the 90's.  In the  80's,  BMP is highly
and positively correlated with both excessive money growth  and with debt to exports ratio.
Table  11  presents  simple correlation coefficients for some of the variables defined above.
It suggests the following:
1-  All governance variables are highly correlated amongst themselves, both
in the 80's and the 90's;
2-  Variance of TOT is positively correlated with BMP (90's);
3-  In the  90's,  GOV4  (regulatory  framework),  is  negatively correlated  with
BMP.  This is  consistent with the  idea the  excessive or inappropriate  regulation  can  go
hand-to-hand  with  financial  disintermediation.  GOV4  is  also  negatively  correlated  with
Tariffs,  suggesting  that the  countries that  have  higher  average tariffs  are also  prone to
having 'bad"  regulation.
4-  In  the  90's,  the  debt-to-exports  ratio  is  positively  correlated  with
excessive money growth.
5-  In  the 90's, GOV5 (Rule of Law) is positively correlated with M2/GDP.
6-  In  the  90's,  Investment  rate  is  highly  and  positively  correlated  with
M2/GDP.
7-  In the 90's,  BMP  is  negatively  correlated  with  excessive money  growth
and positively correlated with debt-to-exports  ratio.
8-  In  the  80's,  Investment  rate  is  highly  and  positively  correlated  with
M2/GDP  ratio and negatively with Debt-to-exports ratio
In the initial specification, we would  like to include the variables related to growth  (initial
GDP,  investment,  lagged  growth,  human capital  (education)];  policy variables (tariffs,  excessive
money creation,  government  consumption  or debt or  deficit); governance  variable  (rule of  law);
external  shocks  (terms  of  trade and/or  its  standard  deviation);  country characteristics  (regional
dummies, etc).
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The difference  of first-differenced GDP growth, relatively to the CG, depends,  besides all
the variables discussed above,  on  the difference  between  idiosyncratic shocks (other  countries
versus CG).  If we  regard  such shocks as productivity shocks, then one  interesting hypothesis to
test  is  whether  the countries  that  liberalized  trade were  subject  to  technological  spillovers  (or
other effects of trade on growth)  that do not occur in the CG.  If it is true that such spillovers occur
only (or  mostly)  in  the  manufacturing  sector,  then  it  is possible to account for that difference by
interacting the  tariff changes with the  share  of manufactures  in  total  exports.  The  impact  of  a
given  effort  towards  liberalization  on  growth  will  be  stronger  the  greater  the  share  of
manufactures on exports, precisely because of productivity spillovers 4.
The composition  of exports  is related  to an issue that  is very important in the context of
import-liberalization among developing countries,  namely,  market access.  Although  the  Uruguay
Round  achieved  a  significant  reduction  in  the tariff  gap  between  developing  and  developed
countries,  little progress  has  been achieved with  respect to  market access,  as  well as with  the
occurrence  of  peak  tariffs  and  tariff  escalation5. We  acknowledge  that  such  distortions  affect
every country differently, depending, among other factors, on export composition.
Another  control  variable  overlooked  both  in  the  present  analysis,  as  well  in the  next
section on fiscal policy, is financial liberalization.  Reinhart and Tokatlidis (2002) provide  empirical
evidence that such  reforms  increase  real  interest  rates  and  promotes  financial  deepening  and
lower aggregate investment (but not growth),  but have an ambiguous effect on savings.
The model  allows  us to  evaluate the role  of  regional  trade.  We  can  compare,  for each
country, the evolution of trade flow (exports + imports) within a trade bloc, to that with the rest of
the world. If a country  is promoting  IL and, at the same time,  its regional trade is increasing faster
than  its trade  with  the rest of the world, then  we  may be observing some  trade  diversion effect.
One possible  way trade diversion  might harm  growth  is by diminishing  or ceasing  technological
spillovers or transfers.
Initially, we follow an arbitrary classification for regional trade, which does not necessarily
match  legally established  PTA's.  Table IV  describes the groups  for which we calculate the trade
shares,  based on IMF's  Direction of Trade Database.
Growth of intra-region trade share isn't necessarily related to the establishment of a PTA
itself.  Therefore,  we  may  want  to  follow  an  alternative  approach  to  investigate  the  effects  of
regional  trade. For  that purpose,  we  will  rely on  the study by Foroutan  (1998),  who proposes a
4  Following  the  World  Bank's  Global  Economic  Prospects,  1996,  Wacziarg  (1998)  uses  the  share  of
manufactured exports in  total exports as a proxy for the extent of technological transmissions.
r The  IMF/World Bank (2001)  manuscript provides an excellent assessment of those  issues. it emphasizes
that industrial countries exhibit: 1-  high  tariffs, tight tariff quotas,  tariff peak and escalation in agriculture; 2-
high protection  (both  tariffs and quotas)  in labor-intensive  sectors such as textiles and clothing. They  also
point that booming antidumping activity and GSP do not help increasing market access for poorer countries.
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criteria to discern non-effective regional trade blocs from  effective ones. The criteria is as follows:
the PTA is considered effective  if the data reveals  an increase in the share and or trade intensity
of intra-group trade in the years following the formation  of the PTA. Whether the observed trend -
after  the  establishment  of  the  PTA  - is  attributed  to  'artificial  statistical  artifacts'  such  as  for
example, an increase/decline in world trade shares or to the PTA itself is arbitrary and subjective,
as discussed in  the paper. A  dummy variable for every effective PTA,  as well as one for all non-
effective PTA, will enter the equations multiplied by twice-differenced  average ATR.
The study suggests the following  PTAs are  effective:
- CACM:  Costa  Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua;
- Andean Pact: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,  Ecuador,  Peru and Venezuela;
- MERCOSUR:  Argentina,  Brasil, Paraguay and Uruguay;
- CEAO/UEMOA  (Communaute  Economique  de  I'Afrique  Occidentale/  Union
Economique  et  Monetaire  de  l'Afrique  Occidentale):  Benin  (joined  in  1984),  Burkina  Faso,
Cote d'lvoire, Mali, Mauritania,  Niger and Senegal.
- SACU  (Southem  African  Customs  Union):  South  Africa,  Botswana,  Lesotho,
Namibia and Swaziland;
- Zimbabwe, Kenya and Cameroon
- NAFTA: Canada,  Mexico and US;
- Israel/US  FTA
The non-effective PTAs, among others, are:
- ASEAN:  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Singapore,  Thailand, Philippines and Brunei  (from
84). Vietnam joined in 95.
- GCC  (Gulf Cooperation  Council):  Bahrain,  Kuwait,  Oman,  Qatar,  Saudi  Arabia
and United Arab Emirates.
- EU-Mediterranean  Initiative:  EU  countries  plus  Algeria,  Cyprus,  Egypt,  Israel,
Jordan,  Lebanon,  Mafta,  Morocco,  Palestinian  Autonomous  Territories,  Syria,  Turkey  and
Tunisia.
Another  question  we  address is  that of  whether  trade  restrictions  operate  differently in
low  versus  high  income  countries.  To do  so,  we  allow  differenced  differences  of ATR  to have
distinct  effects,  depending  on  average  GDP.  We  classify  countries  into  small  (three  lowest
deciles),  medium  and  large  (three  highest  deciles)  average  GDP  in  1980-89,  by splitting  the
sample into three (see Table XII).
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In  the  equations  presented  below,  we  use  Current  Government  consumption
expenditures as the fiscal policy variable, because both government deficit and debt as % of GDP
do not contain enough observations.  Since the sample of countries  is not very large, we want to
avoid restricting it even further.
In Tables V, VI  and VII  we present  the OLS regression  results  under the three different
CGs.  In order  to  account  for  the  comparative  advantage  of  the  country,  we  include  the
manufactures'  share in exports (or alternatively,  the commodities'  share in exports) as  a 'weight'
on  the ATR  reduction.  We also consider dummies  for  PTAs,  to  capture possible region-specific
effects.
Regarding Group  I,  our main findings are  [see Table VI:
1-  Among  the "growth"  variables,  GDP difference in the 80's has a positive effect  in
growth  and  is consistently significant across  all specifications.  Human  capital, measured  as
primary education has a positive sign but is  only marginally significant (around 15%) for most
specifications. The coefficients  on  lagged  investment are  significant (marginally)  only in the
first four equations.
2-  ATR,  which  is  our  variable  of  interest,  is  highly  significant,  but  of  small
magnitude.  The estimated coefficients,  between  -.05 and -.08,  imply that  a decrease of, say,
15 percentage  points in the  ATR will cause  average GDP  growth  (per  year)  to rise  between
0.75 and  1.2  percentage  point. Relatively to a 3%  p.a.  baseline growth,  after a decade, two
countries with the same initial GDP would diverge at most by 12% due to a 15-point reduction
in ATR6.
3-  Whereas 'weighting'  ATR  reduction  by agricultural  products'  share in export does
not result  in significant effects,  the opposite is true if we use the share of manufactures7. Its
estimates  are  around  -.20.  That  means,  a country  with  a 50%-share  of  manufactures  in
exports  will  increase  average  GDP  growth  by  1.5  percentage  point,  due  to  a  15-point
reduction  in ATR.  The effect is slightly higher than that in 2 above,  and will generate a 15%-
gap  on  GDP  after  a decade,  under  similar assumptions.  Countries  with  a  very high share
(close to one)  will increase GDP growth by 3 %-points, leading to a 30%  gap after a decade.
4-  Allowing  for PTA-specific effects  (equations 4, 8 and  12),  we find that,  whereas
ZKC  and CEAO  benefit  from  IL,  that  seems not  to be the case for  MERCOSUR  countries.
The effect for the complement-set  of countries is very similar to that obtained in  the equations
without PTA-specific  effects  (equations  1, 5 and 9) - between  -.05 and -.08.  Due  to  limited
degrees of freedom,  we excluded all PTA-dummies that were non-significant.
6To simplify our interpretation, we are ignoring the CG component  (or assuming it equal to zero)
7Caveat: the WDI  data on the export  shares in general  do not add-up  to one, with  some  even exceeding
unity.
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5-  Macroeconomic  policy  and  Governance  variables  enter  significantly  in  most
equations,  and  always  with  the  expected  signs:  government  consumption  and  excessive
money  growth  both  have  a  negative  impact  on  growth  whereas  the  impact  of  "good
governance", measured by "rule of law", is positive.
6-  Exogenous  shocks  - in  the  form  of  terms  of  trade  shocks  are  marginally
significant  in the first four equations.  Besides  considering terms  of trade  alone,  we tried  to
include a measure of exogenous shock as suggested by Rodrik (1998):  it is calculated as the
product  of  the  variance  of terms  of  trade  and  the  degree  of  openness  of  the  economy
(exports plus imports as % of GDP).  That variable was  not significant and was excluded from
all specifications.
We define CG II as the same set of countries in CG V below, rather than selecting based
on  any  given criteria. This  is done  for comparison  purposes.  Because  of that,  it  contains  both
'open' and 'closed' countries, i.e., countries with low and high average ATR  in 1990-99. Whereas
CG  I is based on  levels of  openness,  CG  II is based on changes.  The  results - in  Table VI -
suggest the following:
1-  as expected, the constant is non-significant in all equations. There is no evidence
of  a  TFP  growth  differential,  which  should  be  expected  in  cases  where  more  open
economies' TFP grow faster.
2-  ATR  alone  is  significant  only  in  the first  equation.  ATR  weighed  by  share  of
manufactures  in exports is marginally significant at near the 10% level, and the estimates are
close to -5%. We were not able to capture significant PTA-specific effects in these equations
3-  Looking at the equations together,  it seems that under CG  II, the effects of IL are
significantly  weaker then  under  CG  I. This  is  true  for all the coefficients:  ATR  alone,  ATR
weighed and allowing for PTA-specific effects.
Finally,  under CG Ill,  we adopt a criteria as close as possible to that used in determining
CG  V - that is,  we pick countries which did not exhibit a permanent  reduction  in ATR,  from the
80's to the 90's. The findings are similar to the above [see Table VIl]: there  is very little evidence
that IL enhances growth.  It is worth  pointing that the present criteria might entail distortions. The
reason  being that  since the ATR  variable  has  been  averaged out over fixed  periods  of time  -
1990-99 and  1980-89 - the shifts in ATR  (i.e.,  IL) are  'smoothed'  out; therefore, selecting a CG
based on percentage-point  reduction  isn't easy, since its dispersion  is low (concentrated  around
zero): for instance, as can be seen  in Figure II,  whereas there's 16 countries with zero or positive
change in ATR  (the CG  ll), there's another  16 which  reduced ATR between  0 and  5 percentage-
points. No clear threshold seems to exist.
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However,  the  coefficients  on  ATR  weighed  by  agricultural  exports  are  positive  (and
marginally  significant at  a  10%  level),  suggesting that  primary  products'  exporters  may  in fact
grow slower if they liberalize imports.
Under fixed/common  IL dates,  overall results suggest that the criteria based on levels of
openness (CG  I), rather than  changes (CG  ll), is the most appropriate  given the specification of
the  model:  discrepant  levels of  openness  are more  likely to  reflect productivity  differences  than
discrepant  changes.  Perhaps  the  levels  criteria  (CG  I) entails  a  conditional  analysis,  which
translates into marginal effects of tariff reduction for countries that are already open (and thus, not
in the CG).
A couple  variables were  excluded from  the model  because they failed to be statistically
significant: dummy variables for currency crisis and world imports.  The former  intends to capture
possible  effects  of  Balance  of  Payments  crisis  on  growth  performance.  Our  measure  of  BOP
crisis is obtained from  Reinhart (1999):  it is  derived from  an index of market turbulence,  defined
as  a weighed  average  of  exchange  rate changes  and  reserve  changes8. If there  is  a possibility
that  a crisis  is  self-fulfilling,  in the  sense  of  Obstfeld  (1994),  then  its occurrence  isn't  directly
related  to  macroeconomic  fundamentals,  as  reported  for example,  in  Eichengreen,  Rose  and
Wyplosz  (1995,1996).  In  that  case,  controlling  for  such  crisis  could  provide  us  additional
explanatory power  in  our model.  The  latter is a  measure of world trade. The  purpose is to allow
the  IL effect  to  be influenced  by the  global  trade,  depending  on the  date  countries  liberalized
imports.  Here we  haven't  been  able to  answer  RR's  question of  how  trade restrictions  operate
depending  on growth of world trade flows.
1.4 - Dating  IL
The next step is to consider the IL date  in each country in the sample. All variables will be
measured  as the difference between  average  growth  rates  before and after trade liberalization,
whenever it occurs.  Just as in the previous  section, we will consider alternative  selection criteria
for the CG,  in order to  allow comparisons  with  those  results. Notice that the CG  component  will
be different for every observation  in the sample, since the differenced  averages are time-specific,
depending  on the  date of  IL  in each country.  The  specification  of the equations will be the same
8The  countries that  suffered  BOP  crisis  in the  80's  are  (number  of crisis after  the  comma):  Argentina,  4;
Bolivia,  3; Brazil,  3; Philippines, 3; Venezuela,  RB, 3; Chile,  2; Colombia,  2; Indonesia,  2; Israel,  2;  Mexico,
2; Thailand, 2; Peru,  1; Turkey,  1; Uruguay, 1.  Countries that suffered BOP in the  90's:  Brazil, 2; Venezuela,
RB, 2;  Argentina,  1;  Philippines, 1;  Indonesia,  1; Mexico,  1; Thailand,  1; Turkey,  1;  Malaysia, 1.  The data is
available at htto://www.o)uaf.umd.edu/facultv/-aDers/reinhartlDaoers.htm
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as  before,  allowing  us  to  compare  the  results.  Differencing  is  with  respect to the two  periods,
determined by the date when the countries implemented  IL.
First,  we  use the  same  criteria  as  in  CG  I above,  but  selecting from  a subset  of  the
countries,  which  excludes  the  countries  that  exhibited  no downward  trend  in ATR  (see  CG  V
below) - we name this CG  IV. We impose that restriction simply because we are  unable to divide
the sample into two  periods for those countries.  CG  IV  is:  Bangladesh,  Egypt,  India, Mauritius,
Nigeria, Pakistan and Sudan.
Next, we define CG  V,  as follows:  instead of selecting countries where average tariff rate
was greater than 25%  on average over 90-99, or  based on tariff reduction  decade over decade,
as before, we will simply include the countries that did not exhibit IL, that is, those  which did not
pernanently reverse the trend of ATR (see  Figure II).  In order words,  countries that did not exhibit
a clear downward  trend  in tariffs.  We are  not  concerned  with  the  level of  ATR  itself,  but  with
changes.  This group contains countries with  a relatively low ATR  throughout the sample (Israel
and Cyprus, for example.  See Table XI), as well as some with high ATR in the 90's. According to
that  criteria,  the  CG  is:  Bahrain,  Congo,  Dem.  Rep.,  Cyprus,  Ethiopia,  Israel,  Jordan,  Libya,
Malawi,  Mauritania,  Oman,  Poland,  Romania,  Saudi  Arabia,  Senegal,  Sierra Leone,  Singapore,
Syrian, Arab Republic, Tunisia and Zimbabwe.
Group V is comparable  to CG II, since both contain the very same countries. CG  V is also
comparable  to CG  III,  for even  though they aren't  identical sets,  they are  based  upon  the same
selection  criteria.  Table XIII  in  the  appendix  describes  the  selection  criteria for  the  CGs  and
exhibits some  statistics.
Table Xl exhibits the dates when  trade reform  took place in every country in the sample,
as detected through inspection  of time-series  of ATR.  It also shows the average tariff before and
after the reform.  Figures II and  III  exhibit the  path of  ATR  (normalized)  for 'reforming'  and  'non-
reforming' countries. The number of missing observations varies according to the country, so that
time  averages  are  calculated with  a  different  number  of observations,  even  for  countries  that
'reformed'  in  the  same  year.  Still, the  patterns  are  clear:  the  reforming  countries  cut  average
tariffs by 15 % points on average, according to their reform schedule. On the other hand, the non-
reformers  (or CG)  increased their average tariff by an average of 2 percentage-points  in  1990-99
compared to 1980-89. And the dispersion of ATR among those countries is high in the final period
(1990-99) - ranging from  nearly zero (Singapore) to over 36% (Sierra Leone).
Table  VIII  presents  estimates  of  the  model  under  CG  IV. It  is evident  that the  twice-
differenced ATR coefficient  is not as significant as  under CG  I and  is smaller in  magnitude. The
same is true for the PTA-specific coefficients  (Equations  40, 44  and  48).  Regarding  the export
profile  weights,  results  are  somewhat  contradictory:  we  find  a  strong  (around  -20%)  and
significant  coefficient  on  weighed  tariffs  both  for  manufactures'  share  under  CGI,  and  for
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agricultural  share under CG  IV. We should  keep in mind that although the selection criteria  is the
same, the countries chosen are not.
Table  IX presents the results under  CG V. That group is identical to CG II. Overall we find
more significant effects of ATR  under the former than  under the latter.  That applies  not only to
ATR alone but also for ATR weighed by export composition and allowing for PTA-specific effects.
We may also compare the results under CG V with those under CG Ill, in which we adopt
the same criteria  but the outcome  is a different CG. The same differences  described above arise
in that comparison  and more sharply (because ATR  is overall less significant in CG  IlIl than  in CG
11).
When we  use levels criteria  [CG  I and IV], there  are no gains whatsoever  in adopting IL-
dated  regressions.  However,  if  the  criteria  is  changes,  then  IL  dating  entails  significant
improvements  in the significance of the relationship between  IL and changes in GDP growth.
The results  suggest that under a more  precise dating  of  IL, the effects of  tariff reduction
on  growth  are  slightly  stronger  and  much  more  significant  than  as  revealed  by  the  initial
estimates,  with  fixed  IL dates9(equations  13,  17 and 21  versus equations 49,  53 and  57). There
are also significant improvements  when  we allow for  PTA-specific  effects (equations  16,  20 and
24  versus  52,  56  and  60).  The  improved  significance  of  the  share  of  manufactures'  exports
suggest that the  export profile may be important in  determining the  potential  benefits from  trade
liberalization.  If  we  interpret  this  variable  as  an  indicator  of  comparative  advantage,  then  our
result suggests  that relatively capital abundant countries  benefit from  IL significantly  more than
labor-abundant  ones. We cannot  tell, however,  whether this  is due  to technology  spillovers in
manufacturing, since we have not identified any structural parameters.
Finally, when  it comes to IL effects contingent on country size, the evidence  is somewhat
mixed. As shown  in Table X, for CG I and IV  [equations 61-63  and 70-72],  we find that medium
and low GDP countries  benefit from ATR  reduction,  respectively.  For large-GDP  countries,  ATR
reduction is not statistically significant. However, for CG II, III and V, large-GDP countries seem to
be the only group that benefits from ATR reduction.
In other words, when  we adopt a criteria based on levels of openness, either size effects
are non-significant  (Eq.  61  to  63)  or only small  countries benefit from  IL. Conversely,  when  we
adopt a changes criteria, it  is becomes evident that large-GDP  countries only are the ones who
benefit from IL (Equations 64 to 69 and 73 to 75).
90f  course,  after  controlling  for  extemal  shocks,  quality  of  govemance  and  other  (non  trade-related)
macroeconomic  policies.
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1.5 - Conclusions for Part I
The effects of IL on GDP growth  were evaluated using a DD  methodology. We compared
results  obtained from  identical equation  specifications, but using alternative  measurements  of the
variables (fixed date versus dated  IL). We propose alternative criteria to determine CGs  under the
two different measurements.  The  CGs contain  countries that are considered  not open to imports
(levels  criteria),  or  that  have  not  exhibited  a  downward  trend  in  ATR  (changes  criteria).  The
purpose  of dating  IL is  to obtain  a  more  sensible time-aggregation  for variables  in the  model.
GDP  growth  acceleration  (or twice-differenced  growth  rate)  depends  on  non-trade  policies and
exogenous shocks, which were  included in the regressions.
Our  results seem  to be  highly sensitive to the CG  choice. Under  a levels criteria  (CG  I
and  IV),  IL-dated  results  do  not  strengthen  the  case  for  advocates  of  openness  as  a  growth
booster,  relatively to  fixed-date results.  Under  a changes criteria  however  (CG  11,  Ill  and  V),  IL
dating  does  strengthen  the  significance  of  the  relationship  between  IL  and GDP  growth.  The
relevant issue then, seems to be that of determining  which criteria  is the most sensible to carry on
our estimation exercises.
We also find that the countries that are predominantly manufactures'  exporters appear to
benefit from  IL more  than  those that  are not.  One  conjecture  is that such  countries experience
productivity  spillovers. that  increase  total  factor  productivity  and,  as  a  byproduct  enhance
competitiveness,  alleviating external  borrowing  requirements  to growth.  One  potential problem  is
that the series of share  of manufactures  in exports may contain distortions due to the differences
in classification of products across countries.  Thus,  it would be useful  to examine the data  more
carefully.  This result  isn't unambiguous:  in  one of  the CG  (IV),  we  find that  agricultural  share-
weighed ATR is highly significant, suggesting the opposite.
The  relationship  between  IL and  growth,  contingent  on country  size  is sensitive to CG
selection as well. Whereas  under a levels criteria, small and perhaps medium-GDP countries only
benefit from  IL, under changes criteria  it is evident that large-GDP  countries only benefit from  IL
[Table  X].  In  theory,  under  standard  assumptions,  optimal  tariff  for  large  countries  should  be
positive. But such assumptions (constant returns to scale, perfect competition, etc.)  may not hold
in reality. In any case, our model does not allow a formal test of the theory.
Since  our  explained  variable  is  difference  in  growth  acceleration  between  'reforming'
countries and 'closed' ones,  differences in TFP  growth are supposedly captured by the constant
term.  In that case,  the estimates of the constant represent differences  in efficiency between  the
two groups,  which may be related to  the trade regime or not. The coefficient of tariffs  is then just
capturing  a 'marginal'  effect from  liberalization.  Under our framework,  it is not possible to  isolate
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the tariff  effect, from  the constant  term,  since  that  is,  by  construction,  capturing  differences  in
efficiency between open and closed economies.
Although  we  are  unable  to  identify such  effects,  we  can look  at what  happens  to  the
estimates  of the  constant when  we exclude the ATR variable.  If excluding  it turns  the constant
significant, then  we might  suspect the constant accounts at least for a part  of the differences in
productivity  that are  related to the  importing  regime.  On the  other hand,  if the  exclusion  of the
tariffs does no affect the estimated constant, then we might suspect that the constant is capturing
productivity  differences that  are  unrelated  to  the  importing  regime. We find  (not  reported)  that,
whereas  excluding  ATR  under  levels  criteria  does  not  affect  the  constant,  doing  so  under
changes criteria  tums  the  constant  highly  significant.  Therefore,  considering  levels  criteria,  it
appears that the identification  problem  is more severe,  in the sense that we cannot isolate from
other effects the IL effect on GDP growth.  Levels criteria reduces the strength of tariff's  marginal
effect on the one hand, but increases the estimated productivity differential on the other hand.
The discussion above reflects the limitations  of the cross-sectional analysis:  it is difficult
to attribute the difference in the efficiency parameter,  between  'open' and 'closed' countries, to IL
alone.  There could be other  effects, which  we  may  not have controlled  for.  In other  words, we
have  not  identified  the  mechanisms  through  which  IL  possibly  enhances  productivity.  The
reduced-form  results  allow for other interpretations  too.  The  result  leads  us to  believe  that we
cannot rely on the  regression  outcomes and  we need to look at countries  separately, either on a
time series basis or using industry-level data, or both.
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Part II:
The Effects of Fiscal Policy Reform on Growth
11.1. Introduction
We  are  cautious  with  respect  to  the  evaluation  of  fiscal  stance  in  cross-country
comparisons.  One  reason  is  that  the  data  on  fiscal  policy - i.e.,  Government  Consumption
Expenditures  as % of GDP, Tax Revenues as % of GDP (GC  and TAX,  respectively, henceforth)
and  Budget  Balance  as  %  of  GDP  - is  not  subject  to  unique  accounting  principles  across
countries.  In several  cases,  quasi-fiscal  operations  of  the central  bank  and  losses of  public
development  finance institutions,  as well  as social security contingent liabilities,  are not included
in  central  government  figures.  Moreover,  the  fiscal  data  can  be  budgetary  data,  rather  than
consolidated, depending  on the country.
Overall, the fiscal data that is available should provide us with a somewhat  blurred picture
of  the  fiscal  stance,  not  only  in  terms  of  its  time  path,  but  also  in  terms  of  cross-country
comparisons.  Nevertheless,  we  believe that our model may still provide some  insights regarding
the  marginal  benefits  of  public finance  reforms,  or rather,  the  marginal costs of not sustaining a
sound fiscal policy over time.
Before  discussing  the  criteria  to  determine  our  control  groups,  we  undertake  an
exploratory  time-series  analysis of  the public finance variables,  in  order  to  detect any particular
properties,  possibly  common  to  the  whole  sample  of  countries.  In  particular,  there  are  two
hypotheses  we wish to test, for every country: first, whether the budget deficit is stationary,  which
translates into a test of the sustainability of the country's total liabilities. Second, we are interested
in whether there  is a causal  relationship  between  expenditures  and taxation. The  results of our
analysis, which will not be reported  for the sake of brevity, suggest the following:  1- For the vast
majority  of  countries,  we  have  been  unable  to  reject the  null  hypothesis  of  a  unit  root  in  the
process  of  govemment  budget  balance  (Overall  Deficit);  2-  mutual  granger-causality  tests
performed  on  GC and  TAX  suggest that for  most  countries  both  variables  tail to granger-cause
one another.  That  is, shocks in  expenditures do not  lead,  or help predict,  changes in taxes and
vice-versa'0. Point  1 above  does  not  undermine  the  importance  of  unsustainability  of  debt.
Financial  liberalization,  changes  in  the  pattern  of financing  of  public  deficits or  shifts  in  private
capital  inflows, for  example,  may have  affected  the  overall  budget  deficits  as  put  forth  n  the
specific series we use.
10 The analysis has several  shortcomings:  the average  sample size is not  large (around 20 observations),
which  may  induce  small  sample  biases;  it also precludes  the inclusion  of other  desirable variables  in the
VAR,  namely,  rate of  Inflation and  GDP growth.  The unit  root  test chosen  (Augmented  Dickey-Fuller)  isn't
robust to structural breaks and serial correlation. The lag length in  the VAR was 3 years.
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Because  GC  is  a more  narrowly  defined  variable,  we  will  discuss the  returns  to fiscal
reform  in terms  of that variable,  rather than  in terms  of deficit. In this way we  hope to minimize
discrepancies  associated  with  measurement,  and  thus  enabling  less  imprecise  comparison
across countries.
Differently from the Trade Reform  analysis, it is not trivial to  identify a fiscal policy regime
change,  regardless  of  the  "indicator"  we  choose:  budget  deficit,  TAX  and  or  GC  and  public
investment.  Unlike  average  tariff  rates,  fiscal  deficits  represent  a  much  more  complex  time
process.  Indeed,  we  do not  have deterministic  and  exogenous  variables,  such  as import-tariffs.
For example,  a positive shock to government's expenditures,  or a tax relief, can be compensated
in the future by tax increases.  In the  long-run,  if we think of a sustainable path for the debt,  we
should anticipate that revenues  and expenditures are co-integrated, with a unit-elasticity. In other
words, the two variables should not drift apart,  and should, in the long run, grow at the same rate.
The time-series analysis described above attempts to address some of those issues.
Assuming  debt sustainability,  we  cannot  "date'  fiscal  reform,  proxied  by  budget deficit,
since that  variable  is  covariance  stationary.  All  innovations  to  deficit  are  temporary,  and  the
probability that it will reverse to the mean in a finite period of time is equal to unity.
Even though our sample  (1980-99)  might suggest that some  countries have permanently
reversed the deficit trend,  it isn't compelling to assume they will stay on that path  indefinitely. This
makes  it even harder to  believe we could appropriately pinpoint structural,  public-sector reforms.
A  temporary,  endogenous  'bad"  fiscal shock,  either  on  TAX  or  GC  (or  a  broader  measure  of
expenditures),  which  has apparently  reversed  the  trend,  could  lead  us  to  mistakenly  include a
country in  our control group. However,  since our sample size is relatively small, there is not much
we can do about it.
It seems then, that the scope of the analysis of the returns  to fiscal policy under a cross-
country  framework  is  relatively  narrow.  The  analysis  above  also  suggests  that  it  is  more
reasonable to  look at  the data aggregated over long  periods  (1980-89  and  1990-99) rather than
its short-run  dynamics,  in order to look at the countries that did not reform  government  finances.
By doing so we will be "smoothing"  out temporary shocks, and thus getting a clearer picture of the
trend: countries that exhibit an persistent upwards trend in the deficit are more  likely to be  on an
unsustainable path, and, because of that, might exhibit more severe macroeconomic  imbalances,
which may deter growth.
In  the  light  of  the  aforementioned  considerations,  the  control  group  will  include  the
countries that obey the following restrictions:
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1-  Change  in  GC  minus  change  in  TAX  greater  than  five  percentage-
points  1
2-  International Trade taxes (as % of total tax revenue) above 30%  in  1990-
99.
The  group  includes:  Trinidad  Tobago,  Cameroon,  Hungary,  Congo,  Oman  and  Brazil
(subject to 1) plus Ivory Coast, Guinea,  Mauritius,  Sierra Leone and  Ghana (subject to 2).  Table
XV  presents  the  data  on GC  and  TAX  emphasizing  the  Control  Group.  If  a given  country has
undertaken  fiscal reforms,  then  we would  expect that either GC did not  rise and/or TAX did not
fall.  The  exception  would  be  countries  that  rely  heavily on  intemational  trade  taxes  (in  those
cases, fiscal  reform  could  widen  the  tax  base,  and  thus  induce a  change  in  the level  of  GC.
Moreover,  it could push the  lax system  closer to an  optimal  taxation  scheme,  where  the excess
burden  is equated across all taxes). So the difference  between  the two  should provide  us with a
quite strong criteria for selection: if it is sufficiently large,  the country has failed to meet any of the
necessary  conditions  for  a  sustained  fiscal  adjustment.  We  seek  to  select the  countries  that
exhibited significant deterioration  of fiscal stance within  the sample12.
Figure  V presents changes in GC and changes in TAX.  Figure  VI presents the difference
between the two, together with trade taxes as a percentage of tax revenues.  It provides us with a
clear picture of the selection criteria of the control group. Some of the possible problems related
to this methodology in the particular case of fiscal policy will be discussed below, when we
comment our econometric results.
11.2  Methodology
Evaluating  the  returns  to  fiscal  reform  is  tricky.  If  we  consider  Barro  (1990)  as  the
benchmark model,  the prediction  is that per-capita GDP  growth  is non-linearly related to average
tax  rate  (measured  as government  expenditure as % of GDP).  The curve  is U-shaped:  growth  is
increasing  in  the tax for  low levels  of  tax,  but decreasing for  high levels.  This  results  from  the
interaction  of the  two  channels  through  which  government  affects  growth:  a  negative  effect  of
taxation on the after-tax marginal  product of capital  and a positive effect of public services on this
marginal product.
We attempt  to  control for those channels  using  two variables:  the  share  of  international
trade taxes  and some  govemance  measure.  If a country relies  heavily on  trade  taxes,  then  its
11  Equivalent  to  a  difference  in average  govemment  deficit  greater  than  5  percentage-points  (1990-99
compared to 1980-89)
12 We find it inappropriate  to define any control group under  a levels cnitena,  based on, say,  GC  levels over
the  90's. The  reason  is that, as  Easterly and  Rebelo  (1993)  point out, there's  a strong correlation  between
fiscal variables (including  GC)  and the initial level of income,  making it hard to "disentangle"  the effects of
the two variables.
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unlikely that the negative taxation-effect  is predominant - thus it will be  in the ascending portion
of the curve.  If a country has 'good"  govemance  indicators, then it  is also more likely - ceteris
paribus - to be in the ascending portion of the curve.  Since o5k control group excludes countries
with high a share of trade taxes, we are properly controlling for that effect. Graphically, we have
per capita growth rate
/  XS~~~~~~~~f
p/  pevornanre  BYa Governance
No shme of Trade Txes  Lava share  of  Traoe Taxns
It  is  important  that  we  control  for  governance,  in  order  to  find  a  robust  relationship
between  GC  and per-capita  growth.  Our  specification  will  allow both  for the negative  tax effect
and the positive  effect of  public services on productivity.  We  will  assume  that the  latter will  be
stronger the abetter"  the govemance.  If GC grows too much in  a country that is badly govemed,
then  the  productivity  effect will  be  weak,  and  thus  probably  dominated  by distortionary  effect
(taxation).  A  possible  way  of  picking  up  such  effects  is  to  interact  the  fiscal  variable  with  a
govemance  measure.  Gerson  (1998)  emphasizes  the  quality  of  govemment  expenditures  as
important determinant of its effects on productivity and thus, on growth  rates.
We  review now rapidly the most recent findings of the  extensive literature on fiscal policy
and  economic  growth.  There  is  great  emphasis  on  composition  effects  of  both  tax  and
expenditure  policy on long-run  growth. In the case of taxes,  results will depend on which factor is
being taxed the  most.  In the case  of  expenditures,  composition will  matter too:  the  size of  the
externalities of public goods (defense,  infrastructure,  education,  etc) will obviously depend on the
allocation  and  quality  of  the  expenditures.  But  that  positive  effect  will  be  partially  offset  by a
crowding-out effect.
Since  this  study  is  not. primarily  concerned  with  fiscal  policy  alone,  we  will  not  be
considering composition effects. We will only test for aggregate effects of fiscal policy.
An interesting,  but not exhaustive approach of the subject can be found in Tanzi and Zee
(1997).  They  discuss  the  relationship  between  fiscal  variables,  namely,  tax,  expenditure  and
budget  policy  according  to  three  different  channels:  allocative efficiency,  macro  stability  and
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income distribution.  As  far as  this  study  is  concerned,  the first channel  is the  most  important,
since  our  "returns"  variable  is  growth  rate.  Taxes  are  expected  to  affect  negatively  growth,
because  of  the  deadweight  loss,  which  is  a  consequence  of  the  distortion  in  incentives  that
agents face.  Deadweight  loss will occur even  if taxes are optimally  structured,  in the sense that
the deadweight  loss is equated  across all taxes
1 3. They report that overall,  the empirical  cross-
country  studies have  not  been  able to  find conclusive evidence  on the effects  of  both  tax  and
expenditure policy on economic growth. One of the chronic problems  is that to a great extent both
taxes  and  expenditure  are  endogenous  and  there  is  multicolinearity  with  other  policies  and
macroeconomic variables. Moreover, all the literature has been subject to the problem of  reverse
causation between  tax and expenditures on the  one hand and growth on the other.  Last, but  not
least, as discussed above, the relationship between  growth and fiscal variables is non-monotonic:
public  expenditure can  strengthen  growth  at  low  levels, but  weaken  at  higher  levels,  the  same
being true regarding taxes.
Table  XIV summarizes some of the most representative  studies that measure the  impact
of fiscal variables on economic growth.
11.3.  Results
The empirical  results will  rely on the same equation specification as the analysis in  Part I
(see  section  1.2).  The basic equation  Is equation  (5).  The difference is that the Control  Group,
as  discussed  in  the  previous  section,  is  now  based  on  fiscal  performance,  not  import-
liberalization. The basic equation  includes: factors of production, proxied by investment rates and
human  capital  levels;  policy variables,  including  monetary  and  tariff  rates;  and  other  control
variables, such as govemance.
The  same  sort  of objection  also  applies  in  the present  analysis:  the equations  are  not
meant to identify structural  parameters  that describe the mechanisms through which fiscal  policy
affects  growth  rates.  As  discussed  above,  structural  modeling  would  require  a  much  more
complete dataset, as well as more reliable and homogeneous  measurement  across countries. We
must  acknowledge  that  the  present  analysis  is  even  more  subject  to  problems  related  to
endogeneity,  multicolinearity and selection bias  in the choice of the control group.  The reason is
that fiscal policy variables are to a large extent more  endogenous then tariff rates:  not only may
they  interact amongst themselves  but also with other policy and macroeconomic  variables,  such
as money growth, inflation and GDP.
13 Our selection criteria for the control groups includes countries that have a high share of trade taxes on tax
revenues precisely because they are more likely to be further away from an optimally structured  tax policy,
i.e.,  most  likely,  the  excess  burden  of  trade  taxes  will  be  much  larger  than  that  of  say,  income  or
consumption taxes.
page 26Relative Retums to Policy Reformn  (Castro,  Goldin and Pereira da Silva) DRAFr
Our main findings  are14: I- GC has a negative and  highly significant impact on  per-capita
growth;  TAX  on the other hand,  is non-significant.  II- after controlling  for country size (measured
by GDP),  it  seems that GC  reduces growth for small countries  only, conversely, TAX  increases
growth for large countries  only (marginally significant estimate).  III-differently from  GC and  TAX,
budget  deficit  is  significant only when  interacted with  GC - the effect  is  strong  and significant.
That is to say, the higher the levels of GC, the more deficits hurt per-capita growth.
The equations presented  in Table XVI  include two country-specific dummy variables (for
Bolivia  and  Nicaragua)  and one  region-specific  (Middle  East  and  North  Africa).  We tested  the
inclusion  of other regional dummies - including  ones for Sub-Saharan  Africa, Latin  America  and
South  East Asia - but they were non-significant and thus, excluded from the equations.  We also
tried the  inclusion  of  a governance  variable and,  it was  not significant. That  is  a curious finding
specially  in  face  of  the  results  on  trade  reform,  which  suggested  that  governance  was  an
important  factor  underlying  growth  performance.  One plausible  explanation  for that fact  is that
revenues and/or expenditures  may be collinear with  govemance  levels.  In  the  lines below, we
discuss the results in detail, equation by equation.
Equation  I: TAX  and  GC enter the equation  separately.  Because  GC does  not include
investment,  we have fewer reasons to  expect a positive effect on growth.  The reason  is that the
externality of  public services on output is largely due to investment,  not GC.  The result suggests
that  an  increase  in  GC  actually  hurts  growth  performance.  TAX,  on  the  other  hand,  is  only
marginally significant,  with  a  positive sign.  One  possible interpretation  here  is that  it  is directly
related  to  some  measure  of  good  governance,  as  for example  rule-of-law  (indeed,  taxes  and
govemance  have a correlation of  .45). We must also note  the possibility that the correlation  may
be reflecting reverse causation, from growth to taxes.
Equation  II:  we  weigh  taxes  and  expenditures  by the  log  of  ratio  of  GDP  to  Control
Group's  GDP (average  in the 80's).  The result  is that only GC  is significant.  Note the  if GDP80
equals C_GDP80 then  the impact  is zero.  If  the GDP  is low enough  (i.e.,  below control  group's
average)  then GC  will  reduce output.  Conversely,  if GDP  is sufficiently high,  then its impact will
be positive.  The  result  is consistent with the  idea of scale effects, as  identified by Easterly  and
Rebelo  (1993).  They  suggest  that  there  may  be  non-convexities  in  the  benefits  of  publicly
provided goods and services.  If for example, there are high fixed costs and low marginal costs to
provide  public goods,  then  large  countries  would  be  able  to  provide  a given  amount  of  such
services at a lower average cost.
14  In  this section,  we  will  be  referring  to  the variables  in the  equations  without  explicitly mentioning  the
transformation  used.  For example, when we mention simply 'per  capita growth" we  are actually referring to
the differenced first difference of per capita growth.
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Equation  Ill: we continue  investigating size-effects by introducing a dummy variable for
country size (measured  by GDP level), instead of interacting on relative GDP. The only significant
coefficient is that of the expenditures for non-large  countries. The result is consistent with that of
the  previous  equation  for  it  suggests that  the  inability of  exploiting  economies  of  scale  in  the
provision of public goods renders small countries no benefit from GC.
Equation  IV: we consider the difference between GC and TAX, which is a 'partial' budget
deficit1 5 (which  does  not  include  public  investment).  We  obtain  a  negative  and  significant
coefficient (-0.10),  meaning  that government deficits  have a negative impact on per-capita GDP
growth.  A six percentage-point  reduction  In the  average deficit  (compared  to the  control
group) Increases average per-capita growth by 0.6 percentage-point. We have:
agrowth _  10
adeficit
Equation  V:  still using  our  'partial'  deficit  measure,  we  allow  for a different  impact  of
deficit depending  on  the country  size (proxied  by  GDP  - see  Table  Xli  for  explanation). The
estimated  coefficients are  only  marginally significant,  suggesting  a  lack  of evidence in  favor  of
size-effects arising  from  budget deficits.  Whereas  scale-effect-results,  obtained  in  Equations  II
and  IlIl above,  possibly relate to economies of scale in the provision of public goods or services, in
this case  it  appears  that  the absence of  such  effect  is  perfectly consistent with  the 'instability'
channel  effect suggested  by Tanzi  and Zee  (1997):  persistent  deficits  may raise  suspicion  that
the  government  recurs  to  monetary  financing,  bringing  about  inflation  expectations  and  thus,
macro  instability.  As  it is widely  recognized  on  both  theoretical  and  empirical  grounds,  inflation
levels and  variance  have deleterious  effects on  long-run  growth  rates.  Assuming  the  instability
channel is the one that matters,  then there  is no prior reason  to believe its impact would  depend
on country size.
Equation  VI:  we  interact  our  partial,  calculated  deficit  with  an  increasing  monotonic
transformation  of  the  governance  index,  but  the  variable  is  statistically  non-significant.  The
purpose was to check whether govemance  could affect perhaps the instability channel of budget
deficits.
Equation  VIl  through  IX:  we  include  the  Overall  budget  deficit  series extracted  from
WDI,  instead  of expenditures  and  revenues  separately'6. That  variable  is  not  significant either
alone or allowing for country-size effects. This equation uncovers a result which is consistent with
that of Easterly and Rebelo (1993)  [see Table XIV]:  they reject Ricardian Equivalence: under that
15  That  is  defined  as  the  difference  between  General  govemment  final  consumption  expenditure  (% of
GDP)and Tax revenue (%  of GDP) [Notation: GCxx  - TAXxx ].
16 That variable  is WDI's  Overall budget deficit, including grants (%  of GDP) [Notation: DEFxx].
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assumption, deficits should leave private savings unchanged and thus should have  no impact on
growth whatsoever. The  Overall deficit  is significant only when  we  interact  it with  GC  (Equation
Vill).  That  means  deficits  are  good  for countries  that  have  low  GC  levels,  but  bad  otherwise.
Interestingly enough,  we find, without reporting, that the deficit, when  interacted with  (a monotonic
transformation of) governance (relative to control group),  becomes significant: countries with  high
'sufficiently good' governance benefit from  deficit increase, the opposite being true for those with
'sufficiently bad' governance17.
We have  considered an  alternative criteria to  determine the control group,  based  on the
change in budget deficit  . That group contains the two highest deciles of the distribution of
changes  In overall  budget deficit"  (1990-99  compared  to  1980-89). The  results,  not reported,
are not much different from those obtained from the first control group:  the deficit does not affect
per-capita growth,  except when  we interact  it with  governance.  Since the overall budget deficit is
a broader concept, involving more blocs (consumption,  investment,  several government  sectors),
it  is  likely  that  cross-country  comparisons  will  suffer  from  lack  of  homogenous  standards.
Moreover,  the potential estimation problems aforementioned  might  be magnified.  Because of that,
we find that, at the margin,  additional results will contribute little to our analysis.
11.4.  Conclusions of Part II
We  have  estimated  the effect  of  fiscal  policy variables  - TAX,  GC  and  overall  budget
deficit  - on per-capita  GDP  growth  across  a sample  of  developing  countries.  We adopted the
same  approach as in the analysis of import-liberalization  reform  discussed in the first part  of this
paper.  The purpose was to evaluate  relative growth-performance,  which  we regard as  one of the
measure  of  returns  to  reform,  vis-a-vis  a  group  of  countries  that  has  not  undertaken  and/or
sustained a sound fiscal policy - either in terms of fiscal revenues,  expenditures or consolidated
deficit.  Differently from  the analysis of trade reform,  in the case of fiscal policy, there are greater
potential  problems  related  to  the selection  of  control  groups.  Those  are  basically  due  to  the
endogeneity  of  fiscal  variables.  As  in  the case  of  the import-liberalization  analysis,  we  do  not
propose estimating  a structural model'9.
17  Again,  this  result  is  consistent  with  the  stability  channel-type  of  argument:  if  countries  under  good
govemance  should  be  able  to  run  fiscal deficits  without  the threat  of  spreading  uncertainty  about future
policies and  destabilizing the  macroeconomic  environment.  Gerson  (1998)  stresses the  importance  of the
quality of public investment, which is,  arguably, positively correlated with govemance.
I  That corresponds to a group of  11  countries:  ROM, TTO,  ZAR,  BHR, ETH, TUR,  BGD,  HUN,  BOL, CMR
and ZAF. See Figure VIl.
19  Say, the effect of public expenditures on the marginal  product of capita, or the effect of taxation on factor
retums  and supply. As Tanzi (1987)  has long recognized, wealthier countries rely more on income and
payroll taxes. Therefore, the effect of taxes are hard to be separated  from initial income levels. In  our
analysis however, our explanatory variable isn't tax levels, but its changes, so we do not expect to face such
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Despite  methodological  shortcomings,  we  have reached  conclusions that are in  line with
the  literature.  Our  conclusions,  however,  do  not  provide  unambiguous  evidence  on  the
relationship between  fiscal performance,  as modeled  in our analysis, and  long-run  growth.
Our  basic findings  are:  1- an acceleration  of  Government  Consumption  Expenditures  is
harmful  for growth;  the same  being true  for the  fiscal  deficit  (including  only consumption  on  the
revenue side); 2-  country-size effects appear to be important,  revealing significant  economies of
scale in the  provision of public goods; that conforms to the literature;  3- the overall budget deficit
seems not to affect growth performance;  measurement  problems related to that variable  preclude
it from constituting  a robust criteria to select a control group; 4 -Governance  levels seem to be an
important element in determining  how  large a response from  fiscal policy a given country  will be
able to  obtain  in terms  of  growth  performance;  "poor"  fiscal results,  i.e.  budget  deficits, coupled
with  good  levels  of  governance  may  in fact  streng.  , growth  performance;  this  could  be
explained  both by the high quality of expenditures and a better tax system.
a problem.  As Gerson A1998) suggest, the literature on aggregate taxes and growth are mostly ad hoc, not
relying on structural models. In  that sense we follow the 'tradition'.
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Part Ill:
Final Remarks and Overall Conclusions
The  cross-country  estimation  results  discussed  in  the  paper  suggest  that  there  are
significant correlations  between  GDP  growth  and  both  IL and fiscal policy reforms.  The paper's
DD  methodology, however - as well as the benter measurement techniques in the case of IL - do
not strengthen  the results  of  the  exisiting  literature.  In the  case  of  IL,  GDP  growth  effects  are
weaker  than  those  of  previous  studies.  In the  case  of  fiscal  reform,  the  robustness  can  be
questioned, both because of data problems and adequacy of the proposed estimation method.
Our results suggest that country-size, regional  or neighborhood  effects,  governance and
export-orientation  are significant in determining  the returns to  reform.  We also would have liked
to examine the effects of institutional  and governance reforms  using our DD  methodology,  but the
lack of adequate data allowed us to treat those reforms only as country-specific effects.
The  analysis  of  the  two  types  of  policy reforms  were  performed  independently.  The
question  that  naturally arises  is  to what  extent the  pace and  sequencing  of the  reform  agenda
might  affect the outcomes.  That  has  been  a  recurrent  issue in  the  literature  on liberalization  of
both trade and capital flows, but there has been "widespread  disagreement regarding  the optimal
pace and sequencing of the structural  reforms", according to a survey by Bhattacharya  (1997).20
In fact one of the reasons for such dissent, as he argues, is that 'the  initial political and economic
conditions  facing  the  reforming  economy,  and  in  particular  the  preexisting  macroeconomic
situation are of crucial importance".
Subsuming  a  specific  policy  reform  into  a  single  variable  is  not  an  easy task.  In the
context of the standard cross-section approach,  making two or more of such variables interact in
order to elicit the cross-policy effects is  not feasible.  Therefore,  the analysis of the dynamics and
the mutual causation between  different policy dimensions would have to be performed in country-
specific analysis and studies.
20  There  is  however,  a  relatively high  amount  of  consensus  in  two  topics:  the  need  to  undertake  fiscal
reforms prior to liberalization of domestic financial market,  so as to avoid inflationary pressures - Chile being
the  good  example  and  Brazil and  Argentina,  the  bad; and  that  liberalization  of the capital  account of the
balance of payments should be the last step in  the reform  process, for not only does it  tend to appreciate the
exchange rate, but demand efficient regulation and supervision of the financial sector as well.
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Table 0: Average  GDP Growth Rate (%)
1980-1989  1990-1999  Difference  I  Ratio
____________________  (A)  (a)  (BXA)  (A
Peru  0.3  3.2  2.9  9.4
Saudi Arabia  0.4  2.7  2.2  6.0
Sudan  1.4  6.9  5.5  5.0
Trinidad and Tobago  0.6  2.7  2.1  4.7
Uruguay  0.7  3.3  2.5  4.6
Guatemala  1.0  4.1  3.1  4.2
Bahrain  1.4  5.5  4.1  3.9
Nigeria  0.9  3.1  2.1  3.3
Costa  Rica  2.2  5.4  3.2  2.4
Malawi  1.7  4.2  2.5  2.4
Uganda  3.0  6.9  3.9  2.3
Syrian Arab Republic  2.8  6.3  3.5  2.2
Ethiopia  1.7  3.7  2.0  2.2
Ghana  2.0  4.3  2.3  2.1
Mauritania  2.2  3.4  1.2  1.5
Chile  4.4  6.5  2.1  1.5
Mexico  2.3  3.4  1.1  1.5
Israel  3.7  5.3  1.6  1.4
Benin  3.1  4.5  1.4  1.4
Tunisia  3.6  5.1  1.5  1.4
Philippines  2.0  2.8  0.8  1.4
Senegal  2.5  3.3  0.8  1.3
Sr  Lanka  4.1  5.3  1.1  1.3
Malaysia  5.9  7.2  1.4  1.2
Jordan  4.0  4.9  0.9  1.2
Maurtius  4.3  5.3  0.9  1.2
Nepal  4.1  4.8  0.8  1.2
Bangladesh  4.3  4.9  0.6  1.1
Jamaica  1.4  1.5  0.1  1.1
Singapore  7.4  7.7  0.2  1.0
China  9.4  9.8  0.3  1.0
India  6.0  5.7  -0.3  0.9
Guinea  4.5  4.1  -0.5  0.9
Turkey  *  4.3  3.8  -0.5  0.9
Belize  5.5  4.7  -0.9  0.8
Colombia  3.4  2.9  -0.5  0.8
Tanzania  3.8  3.1  -0.6  0.8
Korea, Rep.  7.6  6.2  -1.3  0.8
Ecuador  2.4  1.9  -0.5  0.8
Taiwan, China  8.1  6.4  -1.8  0.8
Indonesia  6.4  4.8  -1.5  0.8
Egypt,  Arab Rep.  5.9  4.5  -1.4  0.8
Cyprus  6.1  4.4  -1.7  0.7
Thailand  7.3  5.2  -2.1  0.7
Morocco  3.9  2.7  -1.2  0.7
Iceland  3.2  2.3  -1.0  0.7
Oman  9.0  6.2  -2.8  0.7
Brazil  . 3.0  1.8  -1.1  0.6
Pakistan  6.9  4.0  -2.9  0.6
Paraguay  4.0  2.3  -1.7  0.6
South-Africa  2.3  1.3  -1.0  0.6
Algeria  2.8  1.6  -1.2  0.6
IZimbabwe  5.2  2.9  -2.3  0.6
Kenya  4.2  2.1  -2.1  0.5
,  Antgua  and Barbuda  6.7  3.3  -3.5  0.5
Barbadbs  2.2  *  0.7  -1.5  0.3
Zambia  1.4-  0.3  -1.1  0.2
Cameroon  - 4.0  0.4  -3.6  0.1
Hungary  1,5  0.0  -1.4  0.0
Bunundi,.  4.3  -1.2  -5.5  -0.3
X  Guyanax  -2.8  4.8  7.6  -1.7
Sierra  Leone  1.9  -4.0  -5.9  -2.2
ElSalvador  -1.9  4.9  6.8  -2.5
Romania  0.9  -2.4  -3.3  -2.6
Congg,  Dem.  Rep.  1.8  -5.1  -6.9  -2.8
I  Nicaragua  -0.8  2.9  3.6  -3.7
i 'Argenlina  4-0.7  4.5  5.2  -6.2
Bolivia  -0.4  4.0  4.4  -9.7
Cote d'lvoire  -0.2  2.8  3.0  -11.7
Venezuela,  RB  -0.2  2.4  2.6  -14.8
-Average,  -3  ;- -.  .21=  - 3.1  , -,  =  .4  .
_______________  . .. ;-2.5  2.5  2..  8 .
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Figure II: Change In Average ATR,  1990-99 compared to 1980-89 (% points)
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Figure III  Average Tariff Rates, "Reformers"
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Figure IV: Average Tariff Rates, "Non-reformers"
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Figure VI: Change In Govemment Consumption  minus Change In  Taxes and Trade Taxes as % Tax
Revenue
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Table l: Some Studies on Openness and Economic Growth
Study  Effect of  IL on growth  Openness Measurement  Methodology and sample size
Trade volumes  (-0.039)  7  adjusted trade  Income of the bottom  quintile as a function of GDP per-
Dollar and Kraay  volumes (-0.038), SW  Index (-0.07), ID  capita and openness measure.  Includes regional
(2001)  as %  of imports (-0.16), WTO dummy  dummies. Sample:  137 to 223 countides.
___________________  ~~~~~~~~(0.02).
Cross-section and Panel estimates. Per-capita GDP as a
"a 1 %-point increase in the  function of Social Capability (Adelman-Morris  Index),
(expqrt+imports)/GDP  ratio has  ~~~~and  openness. Estimate using instruments - distance
Pedroso e  an impact in the GDP per worker  (export+imports)/GDP  from  Equator, %  of population that speaks  European
Ferreira (2000)  arond  impact6  in  thsGDPser workrn);+mors/D  idioms; and 'geographic'  trade volume (given by a
0 005% (panel data)  gravity model).  Two-stage LS, 59 countries. Panel-data:
0,005%  (panel  data)  fixed effects, 1 and 5-year averages; 1400 and 280
observations respectively.
On Edwards:  Problems with identification assumption
WDR=-0.0126  and choice of weight for WLS. Use log(GDP) instead of
Rodrik and  HF=-0.02  levels. Include HF's Index of Property Rights  Protection.
Rodriguez (1999)  Trade Duty=-1 .837  Only 3 indicators remain significant, but still, they are
[review  someof  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~subject  to rankidng problem, failing some consistency [review some of  checks.
the most cited  On Doliar: robustness check indicates that only variability
studies:  distortion=-0.008  (ns); variability=  is robust to indusion of regional dummies.  Include also
Dollar(1992),  Ben-  -0.099  initial income and schooling. Use updated Summers-
David (1993),  I  Heston database,  which include more countries (112)
Sachs Wamer  Item 4 of Index is equivalent toadumfoSb-hrn  Afia.Ie5 Sachs  Warner  ~~~~~~~~dummy  for Sub-Saharan Africa.  Item 5
(199) and Edwards  OPEN=2.12  (considering 4 and 5  is strongly related to macroeconomic  On SW: the index core amounts to just the last two
(1998)1  only)  and political variables [inflation,  components (monop.exp.  and BMP)
debt/exports,  quality of institutions
(ICRG)]
SW Index, WB's classification of Trade
SW= 0.0094  Strategies (WDR  1987), Leamer's
WDR=0.0075  (1988)  index, BMP, Average  Import Tariffs=-0.045  Duties and NTB coverage (both by  TFP, 1980-90,  as a function of initial income, schooling
Edwards (1998)  BMP=-0.0217  Barro and Lee (1994)), Heritage  and nine altemative indicators of openness. Estimation
Foundation's Index of Intemational  Method:  WLS (weight=GDP  per capita in 1985)
HF=-0.0074  Trade,  ratio of export and import duties
Trade duty=-0.48  to total trade and Holger Wolf's index of
import distortions for 1985.
Wacziarg (1998)  0.071  Fitted (X +  M)/GDP as a linear  Panel data, simultaneous equations; estimation based on
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combination  of ID, NTB coverage and  Zellner and Theil (1962) - 3-stage LS, 5-year averages
SW indicator  over 1970-89; 57 countries;
Two indices of Trade Uberalization: TR
Vary  depending on time  I: Papageorgiou et al. (1991)  - uses  Cross-section and Panel data with fixed effects;  Very
Harrison (1996)  aggregation (annual data or 5-  comnmer  inaliol  in 1  8  onl  small country coverage for openness  measures - 15 and Harriso  (1996)  year averages).  See p.436  cmeiapocyn1908,nl  5  28 countries respectively. Evaluates  levels and changes
0.02 (TR II, levels)  countries; TR II:  Thomas et al (1  991)  - in  trade policy. based on tariff and non-tariff barriers in
1979-88,  only 28 countries.
Dummy - A country is not OPEN if any  Growth of GDP per capita, 1970-89, as a function of an
d  OPEN= 2.44 [open countries  of the following is true: 1- ATR >40%; 2-  openness indicator. Regression includes: initial GDP, Sachs and  grow two and a ha  %  points  NTB coverage>40%;  3- socialist  investment  rate, govemment  consumption as % of GDP,
Warner (1995)  more than non-OPEN onest]  regime; 4- state monopoly of major  assassinations per capita, schooling, revolutions and
mrtnn.] exports; 5- BMP>20%  in the 70's or  coups, deviation from world investment prices. Sample:
80's.  79 countries.
DIS=-0.02; VAR= -0.07 Reducing  Cross-section: GDP growth in 1976-85,  as function of
DIS to Asian level adds 0.7 %-  RER distoroion (DIS)  and variability  outward orientation and Investment  rates. Includes Dollar (1992)  point to Latin American  growth  (VRER dsotn(DSadvribit'  dummies  for African  countries. 95 countries.  OLS. Does
and  1.8 to African. Reducing  (VAR).  not include basic controls such as initial income,
VAR would do 0.8 and 0.3  education and other regional dummies.
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Table II: Correlation Matrices
TAR80  CGD80  GC80  BMP80  SDTOT80  M2GDP80  M280  EDX80  GOV1  GOV2  GOV3  GOV4  GOV5  GOV6  INV80
CGD80  -0.24
GC80  -0.30  0.54
BMP80  -0.12  0.13  0.47
SDTOT80  0.00  -0.03  0.18  0.28
M2GDP80  -0.23  0.28  0.36  0.78  0.28
M280  -0.07  0.39  0.60  0.00  0.00  -0.12
EDX80  -0.03  0.21  0.41  0.91  0.26  0.86  -0.09
GOV1  0.03  0.22  0.17  0.02  -0.31  0.11  0.32  0.02
GOV2  -0.01  -0.03  0.20  -0.02  -0.19  -0.02  0.38  -0.06  0.72
GOV3  -0.12  0.04  0.13  -0.11  -0.40  -0.11  0.43  -0.10  0.54  0.71
GOV4  -0.11  0.00  0.07  -0.08  -0.12  -0.06  0.28  -0.13  0.65  0.69  0.59
GOV5  -0.12  -0.04  0.16  -0.15  -0.36  -0.26  0.47  -0.24  0.60  0.81  0.83  0.63
GOV6  -0.10  0.08  0.14  -0.21  -0.41  -0.19  0.37  -0.20  0.59  0.67  0.87  0.57  0.83
INV8O  -0.14  0.13  0.18  -0.05  -0.16  -0.24  0.60  -0.19  0.34  0.35  0.33  0.43  0.44  0.22
TOT80  0.05  -0.09  0.13  0.14  0.86  0.16  0.03  0.09  -0.23  -0.08  -0.36  -0.07  -0.21  -0.35  -0.04
TAR90  CGD90  GC90  BMP90  SDTOT90  M2GDP1  M290  EDX9O  GOVI  GOV2  GOV3  GOV4  GOV5  GOV6  INV90
CGD90  0.22
GC90  -0.15  0.30
BMP90  0.19  0.01  0.13
SDTOT90  0.16  0.27  0.06  0.22
M2GDP90  -0.14  0.30  0.04  0.24  0.14
M290  0.15  -0.04  0.37  -0.13  -0.18  -0.43
EDX90  0.23  0.37  -0.08  0.30  0.43  0.18  -0.33
GOV1  -0.32  -0.24  0.05  -0.35  -0.07  -0.13  0.16  -0.41
GOV2  -0.12  -0.24  0.01  -0.35  -0.22  -0.28  0.37  -0.24  0.65
GOV3  -0.23  -0.06  0.08  -0.46  -0.14  -0.17  0.35  -0.12  0.50  0.64
GOV4  -0.55  -0.27  -0.12  -0.60  -0.25  -0.24  0.08  -0.41  0.62  0.54  0.47
GOV5  -0.16  -0.19  0.17  -0.26  -0.16  -0.37  0.45  -0.18  0.57  0.76  0.74  0.40
GOV6  -0.23  0.00  0.15  -0.28  -0.12  -0.13  0.25  -0.22  0.65  0.63  0.83  0.43  0.75
INV90  0.01  -0.42  -0.02  -0.05  -0.27  -0.42  0.63  -0.55  0.10  0.22  0.15  0.10  0.37  0.08
TOT90  -0.02  -0.22  0.27  0.09  0.14  -0.14  0.32  -0.47  0.24  0.16  -0.10  0.14  0.16  -0.04  0.38
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Table  Ill: Description of the  Data
Notation:  suffix xx  = 80. if averaee 1980-89:  suffix  xx  = 0, if average 1980-year before IL;
=90, if average 1990-99  =1, iaverage  year IL-1999
Variable  Description
BMPxx  Black Market Premium.  Source
DEFxx  Overall budget deficit, including grants (%  of GDP)
EDxx  Extemal  Debt (%  GNI)
GCxx  General govemment final consumption expenditure (%  of GDP)
GDP80-LARGE  Impulse dummy = 1, if average GDP (1980-89)  is greater than 35.75 (1995 US$ bn)  -see Table XII
= 0,  otherwise
GROWTHxx  GDP growth  (annual %)
INFxx  Inflation, consumer prices (annual 9%o)
INVxx  Gross capital formation (%  of GDP)
M2GDPxx  M2 growth[Money and quasi money (M2)  (current LCU)] minus  real  GDP growth  (annual %)
M2xx  Money and quasi money (M2)  as %  of GDP
MDUTxx  Import duties (%  of imports)
OPENxx  Imports plus Exports of goods and services (%  of GDP)
PCGROWTHxx  GDP per capita growth (annual  %Yo)
PExx  School enrollment, primary (%  gross)
SDINFxx  Standard Deviation of Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)
SExx  School enrollment, secondary (%  gross)
TARxx  Average Tariff, %
TAXxx  Tax revenue (%  of GDP)
TOTxx  Terms of trade (goods and services,  1995 =  100)
XAGR_CHxx  Growth Rate of Agricultural raw materials  exports (%  of merchandise exports)
XAGRxx  Agricultural raw materials exports (%  of merchandise  exports)
XDUTxx  Export duties (%  of exports)
XMAN_CHxx  Growth  Rate of Manufactures exports (%  of merchandise exports)
XMANxx  Manufactures exports (%  of merchandise exports)
Govemance  Indicators
GOV1  Voice and Accountability
GOV2  Political Stability/Lack of Violence
GOV3  Govemment Effectiveness
GOV4  Regulatory Framework
GOV5  Rule of Law
GOV6  Control of Corruption
Regional Trade (see  spreadsheet 'trade.ds')
RTSHxx  Average  Trade share, (exports + Imports  within region)/(exports + imports  to the  world)
RTSH_CHxx  Average Growth rate of RTSHXX
BOP  and Banking  Crisis (data only until April 98)
BANKxx  Number of Banking crises in period XX
BOPxx  Number of Balance of Payments crises in period XX
PTA Dummy  Variables
CACM  Costa Rica,  El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua
CEAO  Benin, Burkina Faso,  Cote d'lvoire, Mali, Mauritania,  Niger and Senegal
LAC  Latin America and the Caribbean
MENA  Middle  East and North Africa
MERCOSUR  Argentina,  Brasil,  Paraguay and Uruguay
SA  Southeast Asia
SOUTHA  South Africa
ZKC  Zimbabwe,  Kenya and Cameroon
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Table IV: Definition of Regional Trade Groups
MPrmncDsuI  Smjibth  Ampraca  Fnat  AMin,  innimrfingp .lapa  :uih  aharan Af  ica
ARG  ARG  CHN  BDI
BRA  BOL  IDN  BEN
PRY  BRA  KOR  CIV
URY  CHL  MYS  CMR
COL  PHL  ETH
!:nr th ASia  ECU  SGP  GHA
BGD  PER  THA  GIN
IND  PRY  TWN  KEN
NPL  URY  MRT
PAK  VEN  MUS
LKA  MWI
£  haribbean  Mideldi  Fant A  N AfricaEa-ste.rn .urnpe  NGA
ATG  BHR  HUN  SDN
BLZ  DZA  POL  SEN
BRB  EGY  ROM  SLE
CRI  ISR  TZA
GTM  JOR  UGA
GUY  LBY  ZAF
JAM  MAR  ZAR
MEX  OMN  ZMB





1.  Argentna,  BrasD,  Paraguay and Uruguay's  shares were  those to mercosur,  even though they're included in other South American countries
2.  Venzuela's share is to South America
3.  Cyprus,  Iceland and Turkey' shares are relative to European Union
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Table V:  Control Grouo r  -OLS Regression  Results. Dependent Variable:  [GROWTH90-GROWTH8O]-[A-C-GROWTH90-A_C_..GROWTH8O]-
Eq.1  Eq.2  Eq.3  Eq.4  Eq.5  Eq.6  Eq.7  Eq.8  Eq.9  Eq.10  Eq.11  Eq.12
C  0.412  0.377  0.380  0.567  0.355  0.302  0.389  0.528  0.246  0.160  0.280  0.453
0.112  0.192  0.133  0.036  0.172  0.298  0.119  0.041  0.326  0.520  0.234  0.081 GROWhtH8-&A_C_GROWTH8O  -0.418  -0.412  -0.425  -0.398  -0.451  -0.441  -0.445  -0.428  -0.435  -0.444  -0.433  -0.392
0.001  0.008  0.001  0.002  0.003  0.012  0.002  0.004  0.002  0.006  0.001  0.003 NVSO-A_CCJNV80  0.062  0.019  0.058  0.064  -0.029  -0.034  -0.030  -0.022  -0.007  -0.016  -0.006  -0.002
0.181  0.726  0.161  0.139  0.549  0.514  0.548  0.659  0.857  0.701  0.877  0.957 -PoPE80A_C_PE90+A_C_PE8O  0.050  0.038  0.035  0.057  0.025  0.021  0.014  0.033  0.011  0.006  0.005  0.021
0.010  0.037  0.040  0.003  0.156  0.207  0.375  0.044  0.534  0.674  0.733  0.239 TARS0  TARWA_CTAR9O+A.CffAR9O  -0.079  -0.066  -0.050
0.014  ao2s  0Q046 XAGRtV(rAR90TAROA-CC-TAR90+A.-C-TARyOOM7t  *0.132  -0.079  -0.095
0.168  a445  0.373 XMAN(TAR90 TARBSO-&C.-TAR90+&.C.TARIO)lW01  -0.232  -0.205  -0.176
0.015  aoo4  0.009 (ZKC+CEAOr(TAR90-TARtO-C_-TAR9t+.C_TARtO)  -0.137  -0.142  -0.107
0.166  0.216  0.135 MERCOSUR-TAR90-TAeA&.C3TAR9+A_CJTARtSO)  0.126  0.223  0.183
0.016  0.001  0.002 (1-CACM-ZKC-CEAO-MERCOSURr  -0.083  -0.079  -0.055
(rAR90-TARSOA-C-TAR90+A-C-TARSO)  0.011  ao10  ao32 GC9GGCSO-A_C_GC90+A_C_GC80  0.239  -0.168  -0.226  -0.247  -0.164  -0.121  -0.171  -0.177  -0.162  -0.118  -0.173  -0.172
0.003  0.031  0.004  .02  0.042  a0116  0.034  a033  0a29  0.075  a0o20  0.026 M2GDP90-M2GODPO-A-C.-M2GDP9+A-C-aM2GOPO  -0.357  -0.343  -0.348  -0.359  -0.312  -0.318  -0.307  -0.315  -0.349  -0.349  -0.343  -0.363
0.000  aoo4  0.001  0.000  a016  0.019  0.021  0.016  0.002  aoo5  a02  0.001 GOVS-A-C-GOVs  0.804  0.598  0.687  0.705  0.932  0.678  0.898  0.863  0.839  0.683  0.829  0.685
0.013  0.111  0.049  0.24  a012  0.088  0.026  0.013  0.017  0.075  0.026  0a.28 TOT9oTOTS-A-CJTOT9OA.CTOTSO  0.019  0.014  0.020  0.019  -0.002  0.000  0.001  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  0.002  - 0.001
0.101  0.251  0.071  0.160  0.833  0.964  a918  a843  0.943  ago6  a02t  0.877
MERCOSUR  -2.498  -2.260  -1.567  -3.652  -3.010  -2.757  -2.898  -2.507  -2.231
0.001  0.016  0.016  0.000  .QO1  0.001  0.001  a02  0.002
SOUTHA  1.175  0.832  1.136  1.019  0.831  0.975  -1.443  1.280  1.398
0.014  a0161  0.029  0.9  0234  a 127  a01  0.044  0.019
SA  1.207  1.114  1.230  1.510  1.333  1.499  1.295  1.223  1.427
0.001  0.005  0.001  a0002  0.004  0a02  aoo7  0.014  0oo0
(RTrSH-CHsoRTSH-rCH8tA-C-RTSH-CH9O+&C.AT5H.CHOM)10  -0.043  -0.029  -0.040  -0.042
0.009  0.069  0.010  0.008
(FTSH90-RTSHt0A-C-RTSH9so0+C-HRTSO)-100  -0.055  -0.023  -0.055  -0.062
a306  0.670  0.318  0.279
R-squared  0.91  0.88  0.90  0.90  0.88  0.86  0.89  0.88  0.88  0.86  0.88  0.87 Adjusted R-squared  0.86  0.82  0.86  0.86  0.83  0.80  0.83  0.83  0.83  0.81  0.84  0.83
S.E. of regression  1.06  1.19  1.07  1.05  1.16  1.24  1.14  1.14  1.12  1.18  1.09  1.14
Sum squared resid  26.75  33.71  27.44  27.62  33.58  38.52  32.27  33.76  37.70  41.64  35.76  39.96
Log likelihood  -46.50  -50.78  -46.97  -47.09  -51.57  -54.18  -50.82  -51.67  -57.33  -59.41  -56.22  -58.55
Durbin-Watson  stat  2.13  2.08  2.25  2.31  1.78  1.95  1.74  1.88  1.94  2.08  1.98  1.73
Sample Size  37  37  37  37  38  38  38  38  42  42  42  42
Countries with average ATR greater than 25%  in 1990-99:  Pakistan, India,  Bangladesh, Sierra Leone,  Sudan,  China, Egypt,  Mauritania,  Nigeria, Thailand, Tunisia, Mauritius,  Benin, Congo,
Ethiopia and Tanzania
p-values  below estimates
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Table VI: Control GrouP II'  -OLS Regression Results. Dependent Variable: [GROWTH90-GROWTHBO]-[A-C-GROWTH9-A_C_GROWTH801
Eq.13  Eq.14  Eq.15  Eq.16  Eq.17  Eq.18  Eq.19  Eq.20  Eq.21  Eq.22  Ea23  Eq.24
c  0.241  0.703  0.546  0.399  -0.230  -0.003  -0.164  -0.135  -0.196  0.000  -0.172  -0.146
0.575  0.140  0.222  0.371  0.598  0.995  0.695  0.763  0.645  0.999  0.671  0.721
GROWTH8O-A_C_GROWTH8O  -0.499  -0.460  -0.506  -0.459  -0.433  -0.405  -0.452  -0.357  -0.440  -0.403  -0.456  -0.355
0.000  0.008  0.001  0.002  0.012  0.033  0.009  0.038  0.009  0.031  0.006  0.018
INVWO-A_CJNVS0  0.133  0.088  0.111  0.108  0.024  0.007  0.026  -0.002  0.030  0.007  0.033  0.001
0.018  0.187  0.059  0.077  0.672  0.921  0.656  0.970  0.562  0.921  0.522  0.977
PE9OPES  A_C_PE9O+A.C  PESO  0.035  0.033  0.029  0.027  -0.016  -0.012  -0.016  -0.023  -0.011  -0.011  -0.011  -0.022
0.158  0.165  0.232  0.308  0.583  0.669  0.571  0.365  0.692  0.684  0.691  0.205
TAR90-TARSODA.C_TAR9O+A_C_TARSO  -0.050  -0.015  -0.010
0.015  0.340  0.558
XAGRSrNrAR90-TARMA.-cTAR9o+A.-cTAR8OY)OO  0.061  0.127  0.150
0.779  0.559  0.496
XMAN6TrAR9O-TAr5.A..C-TARM90+A.C_TASORflOo  -0.058  -0.043  -0.034
I  a  i~~~~~~~~~.24  0.123  0.2 12
(ZKC4CEAO)(TAR9O-TAREOA_C-TAR9O+A  C_TARSO)  -0.002  0.056  0.067
0.971  0.369  0.277
MERCOSUR  (TARso-TAR80A-CJARso+A,C-TARSO)  -0.053  -0044  -0.031
0.114  0.179  0.291
(1CACM-ZKC-CEAOMERCOSUR)-(TAR90-TAR80  A_C-TAR90.+AC_TAR8b)  -0.033  -0.012  -0.008
0.077  0.497  0.625
GC90-GCOA_C._GCs0+A.  C_GC8O  -0.125  -0.121  -0.103  -0.148  -0.075  -0.096  -0.065  -0.107  -0.072  -0.100  -0.064  -0.108
a049  0.180  0.103  0.029  0.286  0.325  0.364  0.154  0.317  0.273  0.371  o.130
M2GDP90-M2GDPBO-A.C.M2GDP9O+A.C_M2GDP0SO  -0.390  -0.369  -0.375  -0.390  -0.390  -0.386  -0.385  -0.391  -0.395  -0.389  -0.393  -0.398
0.ooo  0.002  0.o0  0.000  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.006  0.005  0.005  0.004  0.002
GOV5-A_C_GOVs  0.453  0.375  0.349  0.314  0.554  0.470  0.510  0.305  0.508  0.451  0.474  0.246
0.190  0.312  0.344  0.351  0.157  0.245  0.186  0.392  0.164  0223  0.199  0.436
TOT90-T0TDA_C_TOT9A0_c_TOT8O  0.038  0.033  0.031  0.038  0.008  0.010  0.006  0.012  0.009  0.010  0.008  0.014
0.001  0.005  0.009  0.001  0.455  0.372  0.499  0.227  0399  0.335  0.427  0.179
MERCOSUR  -0.012  0.358  0.001  0.284  0.501  0.183  0.066  0.463  -0.050
0.982  0.728  0.999  0.703  0.626  0.798  0.917  0.633  0.932
SOUTHA  -0.530  -0.528  -0.548
0.651  0.640  0.630
SA  -0.120  0.626  -0.167  0.649  -0.952  0.324  0.694  0.976  0.413
a852  0.252  0.828  0.363  0 139  0.679  0.330  0.144  0.592
(RTSH-CHso.RTSH_CHa80C-sH.-.CHso+A  C_RTSH-CHS0)  1O  -0.049  -0.039  -0.043  -0.046
0.001  0.004  0.003  0.002
(RTSH90-RTSH8O-A-C-RTSH9O+A-C-RTSHSO)^1O  -0.031  -0.011  -0.034  -0.036
0.559  .849  0519  0.501
R-squared  0.90  0.88  0.89  0.90  0.84  0.84  0.85  0.85  0.84  0.85  0.85  0.85
Adjusted R-squared  0.86  0.84  0.85  0.85  0.79  0.79  0.79  0.79  0.79  0.79  0.79  0.80
S.E. of regression  1.04  1.11  1.07  1.05  1.22  1.22  1.21  1.20  1.21  1.21  1.20  1.18
Sum squared resid  28.93  33.22  31.18  29.50  44.85  45.01  43.97  43.50  45.47  45.08  44.76  44.51
Log likelihood  -49.51  -52.21  -50.98  -49.90  -60.97  -61.05  -60.56  -60.33  -62.22  -62.03  -61.88  -61.76
Durbin-Watson  stat  2.12  2.32  2.25  2.19  2.30  2.30  2.27  2.50  2.27  2.24  2.25  2.53
Sample Size  39  39  39  39  42  42  42  42  43  43  43  43
Same countries as in Control Group V
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Table VIl: Control Group 1III  - OLS Regression Results. Dependent Variable: [GROWTH90-GROWTH80HA  C_GROWTH9N-A  C_GROWTH8O]
Eq.25  Eq.26  Eq.27  Eg.28  Eq.29  Eq.30  Eq.31  Eq.32  Eq.33  Eq.34  Eq.35  Eq.36
c  0.090  0.862  0.379  0.231  -0.464  -0.045  -0.434  -0.379  -0.421  -0.034  -0.429  -0.354
0.851  0.143  0.447  0.627  0.256  0.921  0285  0.411  0.281  0.939  0.273  0389
GROWTH8D-ACGROWH8O  -0.361  -0.274  -0.340  -0.338  -0.312  -0.267  -0.315  -0.272  -0.325  -0.270  -0.329  -0.276
0.014  0.058  0ao26  0.023  0.061  ao92  0.058  0.080  0.041  0.079  0.037  0.047
INV8O-A_C_NV8O  0.079  0.028  0.060  0.064  -0.011  -0.035  -0.013  -0.021  -0.003  -0.034  -0.004  -0.017
0.119  0.553  0232  0.199  0.831  0.492  0.799  0.646  0.938  0.477  0.931  0695
PE90-PE8-A_C_PE90+A_C_PE8O  0.030  0.031  0.027  0.021  -0.017  -0.014  -0.017  -0.021  -0.011  -0.012  -0.011  -0.019
0.225  0.154  0266  0.409  0.540  0.615  0.536  0.363  0.676  0.629  0.673  0.228
TAR90S-TAR8O-A-C-TAR90+A.C_TARSO  -0.037  -0.007  -0.002
0.167  0.730  0.921
XAGRS(O(TAR90-TAR80.A-C_TAR90A_C-TARSO)fOO  0.392  0.357  0.374
0.079  0.080  Q084
XMAN8rAR90-TARSA-CTAR9O+A_C-TARSYO100  -0.020  -0.017  -0.010
0.570  0527  0.696
(ZKC  cEAOr(rAR9o-TAR8O-A_C_TARSo+A.C  TARso)  0.011  0.056  0.065
0824  0.340  0.230
MERCOSUR'(TAR90-TAR8D-A..C-TAR9DOA.C-TARtS)  -0.064  -0.052  -0.040
0.088  0.139  a0175
(1-CACM-ZKC4EAMERCOSURr(rAR90oTARso-A-C-TARg0+AC_TAR8o)  -0.024  -0.007  -0.004
0.257  0.718  0.836
GC90-GC8O-A_C_GC0+A_C_GC8O  -0.190  -0.248  -0.183  -0.198  -0.136  -0.191  -0.135  -0.145  -0.130  -0.192  -0.129  -0.143
0.016  0.010  0.024  .01 1  0.075  0.028  .085  0.058  0.094  0.025  0. 103  0.055
M2GDP90-M2GDPSO-A_C_M2GDP90+A_C_M2GDPSO  -0.421  -0.390  -0.411  -0.423  -0.415  -0.402  -0.414  -0.420  -0.422  -0.404  -0.423  -0.424
0.000  0.000  0000  0.000  0.003  Q002  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.002  .002  0.001
GOVS-A_C_GOVS  0.402  0.116  0.293  0.249  0.466  0.274  0.452  0.234  0.430  0.258  0.427  0.187
0.165  0.703  0.310  0.407  0.170  0444  0a179  0481  0.19o  0.447  0.193  0.517
TOT90-TOTSO-A-C-TOT9DOA_C_TOTSS  0.031  0.032  0.028  0.032  0.005  0.010  0.005  0.010  0.007  0.010  0.007  0.011
0.007  0.004  0.0 16  0.007  0.533  0.275  0.563  0.249  0.411  0.225  0.429  0.169
MERCOSUR  0.787  2.299  1.142  1.244  2.007  1.219  0.870  1.906  0.815
0.423  Q025  0.231  0280  0.078  0255  0.362  .048  0353
SOUTHA  -0.215  -0.234  -0.213
0.847  0.816  0.848
SA  -0.126  0.925  0.103  0.577  1.100  0.446  0.618  1.121  0.517
0.871  0.078  0.896  0.420  Q069  0568  0.385  0.075  0.499
(RTS_.CH904RTSH-CH80  A_C.RTSH-CH90+AC_RTSH.CHOr100  -0.045  -0.041  -0.041  -0.043
0.002  .003  0.005  0.003
(RTSH90-RTSH8O-A_C.RTSH90+A.C.RTSHSS)'IO  -0.038  -0.012  -0.039  -0.030
0.532  0.839  0.536  0.621
R-squared  0.88  0.89  0.87  0.88  0.84  0.85  0.84  0.85  0.84  0.85  0.84  0.84
Adjusted  R-squared  0.84  0.84  0.83  0.84  0.79  0.80  0.78  0.79  0.79  0.80  0.78  0.80
S.E.  of regression  1.11  1.10  1.16  1.11  1.23  1.20  1.25  1.21  1.22  1.19  1.24  1.19
Sum squared resid  35.84  33.65  37.55  35.45  48.41  44.95  48.26  47.12  49.30  45.04  49.22  47.75
Log likelihood  -55.42  -53.30  -55.49  -55.19  -64.53  -61.97  -63.50  -63.94  -65.91  -62.95  -64.90  -65.19
Durbin-Watson  stat  3.11  2.75  2.97  3.04  2.48  2.31  2.46  2.35  2.46  2.30  2.45  2.30
Sample Size  41  40  40  41  44  43  43  44  45  44  44  45
Countries that did not reduce or Increased ATR (average ATR in 1990-99 compared to average ATR in 1980-89)
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Table Vill: Control Group IV'. Dependent Variable: [GROWTHI-GROWTHO-[C_GROWTHI-C-GROWTHO]
Ea.37  Eq.38  E9.39  EqAi_0  Ea.41  Eq.42  Eq.43  Eq.44  Ea.45  Ea.46  Eq.47  EqA48
c  -0.909  -0.961  -1.035  -0.922  -0.754  -0.747  -0.858  -0.766  -1.023  -0.935  -1.042  -1.066
0.188  0.170  0.163  0235  0.216  0.238  0.209  0.234  0.068  0.098  0.083  0.069
GROwrHO-C_GROWTHO  -0.664  -0.609  -0.614  -0.668  -0.637  -0.574  -0.582  -0.638  -0.573  -0.555  -0.568  -0.581
0.001  0.002  0.003  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.004  0.001  0.003  0.004  0.006  0.006
INVO.CJNVO  0.052  0.037  0.022  0.060  0.040  0.010  -0.003  0.050  -0.004  -0.004  -0.012  -0.004
0.373  0.549  0.717  0.350  0.431  0.857  0.961  0.376  0.940  0.933  0.814  0.950
PE1-PEO-C_PE1+C_PEO  0.050  0.044  0.034  0.054  0.053  0.040  0.030  0.061  0.003  0.005  0.004  -0.002
0.153  0.245  0.374  0220  0.117  0266  0.414  0.153  0.928  0.844  0.885  0.940
TAR1-TARO-C_TAR1+C_TAR0  -0.046  -0.046  -0.011
0.066  0.049  0.593
XAGRo(rTAR1-TARO-C-TARI+C-TARO)00  -0.217  -0.214  -0.144
0.065  0.049  0.103
XMAN(r(TAR1-TARO.C_TAR1+C-TAROY100  -0.044  -0.030  0.005
0.599  0.692  0.945
(CACM)(TARI-TARO.C_JAR1+C_TARO)  -0.035  -0.042  0.004
0.568  0.504  0.943
(ZKC+CEAO)(TAR1-TARO-C-TARI+CJTARO)  -0.012  -0.009  -0.035
0.859  0.885  0.654
MERCOSUR-(TAR1-TARO-C-TAR1+C_TARO)  -0.045  -0.044  -0.035
0.169  0.221  0.118
(1-CACM-ZK-CEAO-MERCOSURr(TAR1-TARO.CJAR1q+C_TARO)  -0.059  -0.054  -0.008
0.136  0.114  0.721
GC14CO-C.GC1+C_GC0  -0.104  -0.091  -0.079  -0.095  -0.106  -0.099  -0.080  -0.101  -0.071  -0.074  -0.066  -0.062
0.099  0.132  0220  0.164  0.106  0.117  0227  0.140  0260  0218  028  0.342
M2GDP1U2GDPO-C  M2GDP1+C_M2GDPO  -0.255  -0.253  -0.242  -0.255  -0.258  -0.261  -0.249  -0.259  -0.268  -0.272  -0.262  -0.261
0.029  0.024  0.041  0.038  0.029  0.023  0.039  0.031  0o26  0.016  0.027  0041
GOVS6C_GOVS  0.780  0.687  0.853  0.853  0.796  0.732  0.882  0.843  0.793  0.723  0.822  0.760
0081  0.138  0.097  0.099  0.059  ao86  0.0Q59  0.076  0.062  0.087  0061  .098
TOTI-TOTO.C_TOT1UC.TOTO  0.016  0.013  0.010  0.017  0.015  0.010  0.007  0.016  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.006
0.121  0.198  0291  0.142  0.097  0296  0.400  0.112  0.492  0472  0.583  0.515
(RTSH-CHI-RTSH-CHOC_RTSH-CHI+C_CRTSH-CHO)-100  -0.005  -0.013  -0.011  -0.001
0.652  0.243  0.339  0.939
(RTSH14-TSHO-CARTSH1+C..RTSHO)100  0.002  0.020  0.005  0.000
.955  0.639  0.909  0.999
R-squared  0.829  0.827  0.816  0.831  0.828  0.824  0.813  0.830  0.808  0.812  0.806  0.810
Adjusted R-squared  0.770  0.768  0.753  0.743  0.773  0.767  0.753  0.748  0.756  0.762  0.754  0.732
S.E.  of regression  1.426  1.434  1.479  1.508  1.388  1.406  1.449  1.462  1.425  1.409  1.431  1.494
Sum squared resid  52.864  53.501  56.883  52.297  53.945  55.343  58.823  53.455  60.955  59.524  61.445  60.275
Log likelihood  -58.00  -58.21  -59.32  -57.80  -60.58  -61.06  -62.22  -60.40  -64.05  -63.58  -64.20  -63.83
Durbin-Watson stat  1.78  2.04  1.81  1.74  1.64  1.89  1.71  1.59  1.85  2.01  1.89  1.92
Sample Size  36  36  36  36  38  38  38  38  39  39  39  39
Countries  vwith  ATR higher than 25% in the second period  (i.e., after IL):  Bangladesh,  Egypt, India, Mauntlus,  Nigeria,  Pakistan and Sudan
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Table IX: Control Group V^. Dependent Variable: [GROWTHl-GROWTHOJ-IC.-GROWTH1-C-GROWTHOI
Eq.49  Eq.50  Eq.51  Eq.52  Eq.53  Eq.54  Eq.55  Eq.56  Eq.57  Eq.58  Eq.59  Eq.60
C  0.397  0.713  0.603  0.078  0.257  0.584  0.447  -0.063  0.274  0.509  0.419  0.046
0.259  0.035  0.047  0.829  0.491  0.105  0.163  0.874  0.376  0.085  0.127  0.889
GROWTHIOC.GROWTHI  -0.645  -0.595  -0.650  -0.667  -0.608  -0.563  -0.624  -0.631  -0.568  -0.540  -0.596  -0.578
0.000  000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.003  0.001  0.001  0.00  0.01  o.000  aoo1
INVOCJNVO  0,049  0.031  0.031  0.063  0.017  0.004  0.007  0.031  0.006  -0.002  0.001  0.013
0368  0.596  0.573  0272  0.736  0.946  0.891  0.583  0.897  0.966  0.978  a0774
PE1-PEO-C_PE1+C_PEO  0.024  0.027  0.017  0.016  0.011  0.018  0.006  0.005  0.000  0.002  -0.003  -0.006
0.470  0451  0.642  0.679  0.751  0.643  0.884  0.905  0.990  0.917  0.894  0.794
TARI-TARO0C_TAR1+C_TARO  -0.034  -0.030  -0.026
ao58  0.082  0.061
XAGRO0(TAR1-TARO.C-TAR1+C_TARO)1OO  -0.108  -0.072  -0.090
.512  0.717  0524
XMAW(TAR1-TARO0C-TAR1+CJTAROyIOO  -0.047  *-0.046  -0.044
0.078  0.087  0.029
(CACM)-(rAR1-TARO-C_TARI+C_TARO)  -0.226  -0.240  -0.203
0.037  0.041  .031
(ZKC4CEAO)(TAR1-TARO-CTAR1+C_TARO)  -0.067  -0.050  -0.035
0.094  0.234  0.380
MERCOSURW(TAR1-TAR0-C-TAR1+C_TARO)  -0.030  -0.017  -0.024
0.266  0632  0257
(1-CACM-ZKC-CEAO4MERCOSUR)-(TAR1-TARO-C_TAR1+C_TAR0)  -0.047  -0.043  -0.035
0.013  Q015  0017
GC1-GCO-C_GC1+C_GCO  -0.075  -0.064  -0.075  -0.034  -0.076  -0.073  -0.076  -0.040  -0.077  -0.068  -0.075  -0.046
a.153  0.262  0.164  0557  0.178  0270  0.177  0.478  aQ113  0.202  0.125  0.404
M2GDP1-A2GDPO-C0_M2GDP1+C_M2GDPO  -0.261  -0.262  -0.254  -0.258  -0.271  -0.270  -0.263  -0.266  -0.278  -0.279  -0.270  -0.270
0.009  0.013  0.013  0.009  .009  0.012  013  0009  0.005  0007  0.008  .007
GOv5-C-GovS  0.980  0.959  0.945  1.122  1.025  0.995  0.988  1.153  0.963  0.948  0.947  1.040
0.012  0.022  0018  0.013  0.007  0.014  0010  0013  0.008  0.013  0.009  .011
TOT1-TOTO-C_TOT1+C_TOTO  0.009  0.007  0.006  0.007  0.006  0.004  0.003  0.003  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002
0219  0337  0.388  0337  0430  0.517  0640  0629  0.460  0.573  0.635  0.685
(RTSH_CH1RTSH_CH04C_RTSH-CH1+C_RTSItCHOr100  -0.016  -0.014  -0.014  -0.016
0.160  0219  0.222  0213
(RTSH1-4TSHOC_RTSH1+C_RTSHO)-100  -0.007  0.003  -0.005  0.020
0.869  0957  .909  0718
R-squared  0.843  0.832  0.841  0.853  0.835  0.826  0.836  0.846  0.831  0.824  0.833  0.840
Adjusted R-squared  0.798  0.783  0.795  0.790  0.788  0.776  0.788  0.781  0.793  0785  0.796  0.786
S.E. of regression  1.291  1.336  1.299  1.315  1.322  1.358  1.322  1.344  1.255  1.281  1.247  1.277
Sum squared resid  51.647  55.313  52.335  48.417  54.204  5Z7137  54.157  50.582  56.743  59.074  55.954  53.812
Log likelihood  -62.91  -64.31  -63.18  -61.59  -63.90  -64.98  -63.88  -62.48  -69.07  -69.97  -68.75  -67.88
Durbin-Watson stat  2.00  1.82  2.01  2.08  1.96  1.80  2.00  2.01  1.90  1.80  1.95  1.94
Sample Size  41  41  41  41  41  41  41  41  45  45  45  45
*  Countries without a downward trend in ATR: Bahrain, Congo, Cyprus, Ethiopia,  Israel, Jordan,  Lybia, Malawi, Mauritania,  Oman, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia,  Senegal,
Sierra  Leone, Singapore, Syria Tunisia and Zimbabwe.
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Table X: IL and Country Size. Dependent Variable: [GROWrHXX-GROWTHXXH-C_GROWTHXX-C_GROWTHXX]
FRxed-date Regresslons  IL-Dated Regressions
Control aroup I  Contl Group 11  Control Group IU  Control Group IV  Control Group V
Eg.61  Eq.62  Eq.63  Eq.64  EQ.65  Eq.66  EQ.67  EQ.68  Eq.69  Eq.70  Eq.71  E1.72  Eq.73  Eq.74  Eq.75
c  0.447  0.293  0.259  0.463  0.059  -0.089  0.200  -0.468  -0.505  -1.097  -0.981  -0.855  0.732  0.602  0.466
0.117  0.339  0.331  0.238  0.886  0.820  0.618  a246  0.152  0.064  0.138  0.178  0.042  0.079  0.171
aRowrKUxA.cGRoWTHz  -0.405  -0.440  -0.419  -0.453  -0.375  -0.348  -0.381  -0.334  -0.319  -0.656  -0.746  -0.663  -0.607  -0.570  -0.536
0.001  0.005  0.002  0.001  0.018  0.017  0.004  0.019  0.014  0.001  aoo1  0.001  0.0o0  0.002  0.0o1
IVX(-A&C_.NV.X  0.079  -0.001  0.006  0.064  -0.048  -0.039  0.033  -0.044  -0.037  0.035  0.078  0.064  0.000  -0.032  -0.028
o.o96  a083  0.890  0.344  0.491  0.567  0.493  0.374  0.405  0.534  0.222  o.25o  o.999  0.606  0.592
PMa.4C.PEXX.c_PUxx  0.045  0.020  0.010  0.036  0.003  -0.005  0.032  -0.002  -0.007  0.026  0.031  0.055  0.039  0.027  0.004
0.035  0.401  0.585  0.037  0.884  0.757  0o0s  0.938  0.675  0.443  0.361  0.120  0.219  0.404  0.860
awDxxYSMALLTARXTAPU-C_-TAPR.A-C_TAM  -0.029  -0.030  -0.007  0.030  0.080  0.065  0.018  0.031  0.030  -0.059  -0.132  -0.078  0.040  0.045  0.025
0.503  .576  a871  0.377  0.059  0.127  0.306  o.  196  0.185  0.053  0.008  0.019  0.565  0.505  0.674
ssPUWxA_T  APMA-C-TARxxAC  TAxx  -0.080  -0.035  -0.040  -0.014  0.012  0.012  -0.029  -0.028  -0.024  0.011  0.008  -0.004  -0.011  -0.007  -0.010
a040  a447  0.362  0.508  0.575  0.545  0.122  0.287  0.278  0.720  a0806  0.894  0.541  a695  0.551
awOXXLAROE(TARXX  T-PXX-AC-TARX.A,C-TARXX  -0.075  -0.041  -0.039  -0.050  -0.026  -0.024  -0.059  -0.042  -0.037  0.029  -0.042  -0.041  -0.039  -0.035  *0.032
0203  as46  0.291  0.017  0.213  0.228  ao11  0.074  ao59  0.474  0.302  0.362  a045  a059  ao67
CxX4cu&c_a.cxx.AcacxX  -0.251  -0.161  -0.158  -0.160  -0.107  -0.119  -0.207  -0.147  -0.150  -0.077  -0.097  -0.100  -0.111  -0.111  -0.102
0.002  a063  0.052  ao11  0.178  a0107  0.003  0.070  0.046  a222  a0150  0.144  0.076  0.098  0.088
M2acPD14  DPXX&_C  &.c.PXX  mAC_PXX  -0.396  -0.369  -0.398  -0.381  -0.386  -0.409  -0.412  -0.420  -0.433  -0.277  -0.307  -0.276  -0.241  -0.250  -0.267
aoo1  0.011  o0.02  aooo  ao0  aoo1  aooo  o.001  0.ooo  ao14  aoo3  0.015  a012  0.011  ao06
aovc-a~CovO  0.623  0.665  0.583  0.460  0.574  0.490  0.436  0.478  0.419  0.852  1.100  0.939  1.050  1.096  1.007
0.079  0.129  0.099  0.141  0.099  0.104  a101  0.156  a14o  0.054  a.21  0.043  0.008  0.004  0.006
ToTxx.TOTxxM_..  CTOTXX.A..  0.029  0.009  0.009  0.034  0.007  0.009  0.030  0.008  0.008  0.000  0.009  0.014  0.006  0.003  0.000
a015  0.390  a0363  0.001  0.398  a30s  aoo2  0.328  0.251  0.327  0.386  0.134  0.418  0.734  0.666
mRTSHcHXXRTHxx-A  ,C_TSNRCHxx,&c..RTBHc-sHxx)  -0.049  -0.046  -0.044  0.020  -0.016
ao4  0.001  aooo  0.126  a0174
(wfTaffMX&xx_&c.TMSa-C_RwHxxr1Oo  -0.027  -0.039  -0.027  -0.004  -0.009
a673  0.432  0.625  0.934  0.837
R-squared  0.89  0.84  0.85  0.91  0.87  0.86  0.90  0.86  0.85  0.83  0.86  0.85  0.86  0.85  0.84
Adjusted  R-squared  0.84  0.78  0.79  0.88  0.82  0.82  0.86  0.81  0.81  0.77  0.80  0.78  0.80  0.79  0.79
S.E. of regression  1.15  1.33  1.25  0.95  1.12  1.13  1.01  1.16  1.15  1.38  1.32  1.37  1.27  1.31  1.26
Sum squared resid  31.61  44.04  46.60  24.62  37.53  40.75  29.62  42.99  44.69  53.21  41.96  48.72  47.06  49.41  53.77
Log likelihood  -48.74  -55.72  -60.80  -46.37  -57.23  -59.86  -51.51  -61.92  -63.70  -61.40  -53.84  -58.64  -61.00  -62.00  -67.86
Durbin-Watson stat  2.25  1.85  1.88  2.04  2.44  2.43  2.92  2.42  2.26  1.50  1.58  1.50  1.82  1.82  1.92
Sample Size  36  36  36  39  42  43  41  44  45  39  36  38  41  45  45
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Table XI: Average Tariff Reduction - 'Reformers' versus 'Non-Reformers'
country  Yeaw  of  Average Tariff  Rots (1k
'Reformw  Before  After  Diference
Aigerla  1983  37.9  24.2  -13.7
Guineoa  1984  48.3  12.2  -38.1
Chile  1985  35.0  13.5  -21.5
MoroCoo  198  41.0  23.8  -17.4
Iloaknd  1987  9.0  4.0  -4.9
MWACO  1987  24.4  12.5  -11.9
Ghaa  1988  29.4  15.6  -13.8
South Africa  1988  25.4  9.6  -15.8
Taiwan. China  1988  28.9  10.2  -16.8
BuundiM  1989  37.3  15.6  -21.8
Hungary  1989  18.5  12.2  -6.'3
Korea.  Rep.  19819  22.3  1  1.8  -10.7
MaurlitLus  199388  27.6  -9.2
Cameroon  1990  29.7  20.2  -9.6
Indonesia  1990  30.4  15.7  -14.7
Peru  1990  35.5  16.4  -19.1
Sudan  1990  52.3  32.8  -19.5
Unuguay  1990  37.1  14.0  -23.1
Venezuela, RB  1990  30.5  14.1  -16.3
Argentina  1981  27.6  11.5  -16.1
olIvia  1991  17.4  9.7  -7.6
Brazil  1991  45.4  15.0  -30.4
Colormbia  1991  38.1  12.9  -23.2
Cote dlvoira  1991  27.0  22.2  -4.6
Ecuador  1991  32.3  12.3  -20.0
Sri Lanka  199  3.2.2  -7.9
Guatermala  1992  17.3  10.7  -6.6
India  1992  87.2  40.7  -46.5
Nepal  1992  21.1  14.6  -6.2
Philippines  1992  29.9  17.1  -12.7
Bangladesh  .1993  90.2  32.1  -58.1
Costgk  Rica  1993  17.0  10.0  -7.1
Egypt.  Arab  Rep.  1993  41.6  29.0  -12.6
El Salvador  1993  17.4  9.4  -8.1I
Kenya  1983  39.3  17.0  -22.3
Antiguia  and Barbuda  19413.6  10.9  -2.7
Berdn  1994  41.4  16.6  -24.6
Nigeria  1994  33.6  26.0  -7.5
Pakistan  1994  68.6  48.8  -22.0
Paraguay  1994  12.0  8.3  -2.7
ThaIland  1994  39.4  21.1  -18.2
Barbados  1995  19.5  13.2  -6.3
China  1995  41.4  22.0  -19.4
Jant'alca  1995  18.5  11.7  46.9
Majayala  1995  14.0  6.9  -5.1
Nicargua  1995  14.0  6.6  -5.2
Tanzania  1995  29.0  21.7  -7.3
Tuorkey  1995  26.3  13.9  -12.4
Uganda  1995.  19.a  13.7  -6.1
Beliza  1996  16.3  8.5  -6.6
Guyarna  1996  18.4  12.4  -8.0
TrinIdad  and Tobago  1996  16.2  10.7  -7.8
Zan1bla  1996  27.3  11.3  -16.0
I=iotru  1980-89  1990-99  Diference
Bahrain  -3.8  4.3  0.6
Contgo.  Dem. Rep.  -22.8  27.1  4.3
Cyprus  -13.6  11.1  -2.4
EthlOpa  -29.3  26.6  -2.4
Israel  -7.8  7.9  0.1
Jordan  -15.3  18.6  1.3
LIbya  -18.1  24.2  6.1
MatawIA  19.4  19.2  -0.2
Mauritania  -21.2  30.2  9.0
Oman  -2.5  5.0  2.5
Poland  13.7  12.9  -0.8
Romania  -16.6  12.3  -4.2
SaudI Arabia  -4.4  12.5  8.1
Senegal  -13.2  13.1  0.0
Sierra  Leone  -29.6  3.8.  7.3
Singapore  -0.3  0.3  0.0
Syrian  Arab Republic  -14.6  15.6  1.0
Tunisa  -25.9  28.5  2.6
Zirnbab,ve  -9.4  18.3  6.9
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Table XII: Classification of Countries by Size (Measured  by GDP In  1995 US$)*
Small  Medium  Large
Antigua and Barbuda  Bangladesh  Algeria
Bahrain  Cameroon  Argentina
Barbados  Chile  Brazil
Belize  Congo, Dem. Rep.  China
Benin  Costa Rica  Colombia
Bolivia  Cote d'lvoire  Egypt, Arab  Rep.
Burundi  Ecuador  Hungary
Cyprus  El  Salvador  India
Ethiopia  Guatemala  Indonesia
Ghana  Iceland  Israel
Guinea  Kenya  Korea, Rep.
Guyana  Morocco  Malaysia
Jamaica  Nigeria  Mexico
Jordan  Oman  Peru
Libya  Pakistan  Philippines
Malawi  Paraguay  Romania
Mauritania  Sri Lanka  Saudi Arabia
Mauritius  Syrian Arab Republic  Singapore
Nepal  Trinidad and Tobago  South Africa
Nicaragua  Tunisia  Taiwan, China
Poland  Uruguay  Thailand
Senegal  Zimbabwe  Turkey





'Small:  less than 5 US$ bil., average  1980-89
Medium:  between 5  and 35.75 US$ bil., average  1980-89
Large:  more than 35.75 US$ bil., average 1980-89
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Table Xil: Control Groups: Criteria and Statistics
j  Criteria  Control Group Countries  IGROWTH  INV  I  PE  ATR  I  GC  |  M2GDP  i  GOV5  TOT  RTSHCHi
1  1  2  11  I  1  2  :1  1  1  2  1  1  2  il  1  1  2  1  1  11  21l  1T  21
Fixed-date  Rearesslons  ___________
Pakistan, India,  Bangladesh,
ATR >25%  Senra  Leone, Sudan, China,
Group I  in 2nd  T  T  ,  Mauriis  4.02  3.74  20.81  20.92  77.04  80.35  43.59  33.49  13.75  11.9  -3.89  -4.11  -0.32  -0.32  110.89  98.49  0.11  0.09 period*  Benin, Congo  Dem. Rep..
____Ethopia.  Tanzania
Control
Group 1  same as V below  2.85  3.2  24.27  20.43  83.97  87.28  14.8  16.99  20.1  17.99  -2.51  -1.37  0.13  0. 13  108.53  100.09  0.19i  0.06
Mauritania,  Zimbabwe.  Saudri
Aabia, Sierra Leone,  Libya,
Contrl  chage  incong.Tuniia,omn,Joran"I.9  3.9  202  052  803  117  37169  20.75  17.89  -2.53  -1.38  0.04  0.04  110.32  99.77  0.21  0.06
Group IlI  ATR>=-0  Syria. Bahrain.  Paraguay. Israel29  .9  2.22.2  8.39.7  1.  66




Control  above, and  Bangladesh,  Egypt, Indiai
Group IV  excluding  Maurilius,Nleria, Pakistanand  4.22  4.99  20.1  21.16  78.32  86.79  55.55  37.72  12.28  10.53  -3.99  -4.77:  -0.37  -0.37  131.41  102.77  0.04  0.08 Gru  Vcountries In  V Sudan
below
No
donadBahraln. Congo. Dem.  Rep..  downward  Cyprus.  Ethiopia. Israel,  Jordan.
trn  ii  bya, Malawl,  Mautritna,
CGontrl  V  TFi(See  Ama,  Plnd.  Lom  ne,  2.99  3.15  23.90  20.78  84.07  88.36  15.53  15.10  19.67  17.17  -2.44  -2.38  0.13  0.13  108.71  98.95  0.18  0.07
equivalent  Singapore. Syrian. Arab toca  Republic, Tunisia and
tcange  Zimbabwe
__ _  _  in A  TR>O  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
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Table XIV: Studies on Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
Effect of Tax on  Effect of  Effect of
Study  Growth*  Expenditures on  Deficit on  Methodology and Sample
____________  ~~~~~~Growth  Growth  ___________________
Engen and  Growth of tax rate:  Growth of GC:  86 developina countries. Explained:  GDP growth,
Ekingen  and92  -0.06  -0.105  - average  1970-85. Controls:  investment rate,
Skinner (1992)  ;137  1.67  population growth,  levels of GC and tax rate, initial
(1.37)  (1.67)  GDP.  Uses 2-stage instrumental variables.
GC net of education  105 countries. Explained:  Per-capita growth and
and defense:  Investment Rate, average 1970-88. Controls:  initial
Non-tax revenue:  -0.075  GDP,  initial PE and SE, assassinations, revolutions,
0.106  (-1.56)  war casualties,  M2/GDP and trade share in 1970.
Easterly and  (1.14)  -0.129  Tests 13 tax variables, one at a time: only 'marginal'
Rebelo (1993)  'Marginal' income  Expenditure  on  (2.22)  income tax is signfficant. Stresses the strong
tax:  general public  correlation of fiscal variables with income levels.
-0.05  services:  Taxes are not significant in general. Other policy
(-1.19)  -0.24  variables make the fiscal variables even less
(-1.78)  significant.
Ratio of GC (net of
spending on defense  87 countries. Explained: per-capita growth, average
Barro and  and education)  to  65-75 and 75-85. Use Barro and Lee (1994) dataset.
Sala-l-Martin  GDP: -0.11  Controls: initial GDP, PE and SE (male and female),
(1995)  (average  over  life expectancy, investment  rate, BMP and political
several equations,  instability. Uses SUR and instrumental variables.
highly significant)
*t-statistics  in parenthesis
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Table XV:  Fiscal Policy Variables:  Non-Control  and Control Group
1  Government
Government Consumption Expendtures  %  Tax Revenue as %  of GOP  Consumptlan minus
of GOP  JTaxes (ditferenced
C ountry______________________________  I_______________________________  ditherence)
1980-89  1990-99  difference  1980-89  1990-99  difference
(A)  (B)  (C)=(B)-(A)  (D)  (E)  (F)=(E)-(D)  (G)=(F)-(C)
Non-Control Group
Syria  20.5  13.0  -7.5  13.1  17.3  4.2  -11.6
Romania  5.9  13.5  7.6  10.3  28.0  17.8  -10.2
Jordan  27.3  23.8  -3.4  14.4  19.7  5.4  -8.8
Nicaragua  29.6  20.3  -9.3  26.2  24.9  -1.3  -8.0
Uruguay  13.7  12.2  -1.5  21.3  26.0  4.7  -6.2
Bangladesh  8.9  4.5  -4.4  5.6  7.0  1.4  -5.8
Ecuador  12.5  9.9  -2.6  12.8  15.5  2.7  -5.3
Kenya  18.3  16.4  -1.9  18.7  21.6  2.9  -4.8
Thailand  12.1  10.1  -2.0  13.9  16.2  2.3  -4.4
Uganda  9.9  9.6  -0.2  6.2  10.1  3.9  -4.1
Zimbabwe  20.1  17.5  -2.6  20.9  22.3  1.5  -4.0
Peru  10.3  9.2  -1.1  11.8  14.1  2.3  -3.4
Malaysia  15.5  12.1  -3.5  20.5  19.8  -0.7  -2.8
Morocco  16.6  17.2  0.6  20.8  24.0  3.3  -2.6
Malawi  17.5  15.5  -2.0  17.5  17.2  -0.3  -1.7
Philippines  8.5  11.3  2.9  11.3  15.6  4.3  -1.4
Bolivia  11.6  13.3  1.8  8.8  12.0  3.2  -1.4
Indonesia  10.2  7.8  -2.5  17.0  15.9  -1.1  -1.4
Singapore  11.3  9.5  -1.8  16.9  16.2  -0.6  -1.2
Korea, Rep.  10.7  10.4  -0.3  15.3  16.1  0.8  -1.1
Cyprus  15.0  17.8  2.8  20.1  24.0  3.9  -1.1
Egypt  16.2  10.5  -5.8  24.5  19.6  -4.9  -0.9
Nepal  8.8  8.8  0.0  7.0  7.8  0.8  -0.8
Tunisia  16.5  16.1  -0.4  24.5  24.8  0.3  -0.7
Costa Rica  15.8  13.6  -2.2  19.2  17.7  -1.5  -0.6
Paraguay  6.7  7.3  0.6  8.7  9.3  0.6  0.0
Iceland  18.4  21.4  3.1  22.6  25.6  3.0  0.1
Pakistan  12.5  12.5  0.0  13.1  13.0  -0.2  0.2
Bahrain  20.7  21.7  1.0  6.9  7.6  0.8  0.2
Turkey  8.9  12.3  3.4  12.4  15.5  3.1  0.3
Chile  12.7  10.3  -2.4  21.5  18.7  -2.8  0.4
South Africa  17.4  19.7  2.3  22.3  24.0  1.7  0.6
Venezuela, RB  11.1  7.7  -3.4  19.0  14.8  -4.2  0.8
India  11.1  11.4  0.3  10.0  9.3  -0.6  0.9
Ethiopia  15.7  13.4  -2.3  13.4  10.2  -3.2  0.9
Burundi  9.3  12.8  3.4  13.6  15.9  2.3  1.1
Sri Lanka  9.1  9.9  0.8  17.5  17.0  -0.5  1.3
Mexico  9.3  10.1  0.8  14.2  13.0  -1.2  2.0
Israel  35.5  29.1  -6.4  43.3  33.6  -9.7  3.2
Argentina  4.5  10.0  5.5  10.3  12.0  1.7  3.8
Jamaica  17.4  13.3  -4.1  28.4  20.4  -8.0  3.9
Colombia  10.1  14.9  4.9  10.4  10.9  0.5  4.3
Control GrOUD
LQ2Ž>
.<Hu,,ngary.  - ,  10.3.  )1.1,  0.7  467  36.8  -;  10.0 |  10.7
.'Omnga  -.  2&2  . ,,2 5.1  10.6  8.1  -2.5  - -6
am,~i  0.  -. -:  -,10.0  10  i.06  -. 17.2  :10.4v-.  6.9  7.4
ATriIdT dObTEgo  18.7  :.,,12.2  -. 6  35.9  231  -128.  6.3
.10.6  18.3  7.7  -16.8  18.6;  1..9  - -
riig,~.-.Fep'  -9.0  107  .~  .,  ....  ~  .. 5
Trade  Taxes >  30%
___  U  li  t  ;  '  - - *.8.9  7.0  -2.0  :11.4  110  -04  ..  -;  1
A,Qotedlvolre  X-  16.5  ,  ,:  ,-13.6  I  -2.9  21.1  -20.5  06  ,  :  23
:'Sirra Leone  86  10.5'  1.9  7.0  8.5  1.5  04
MiaZiUus  127  11.9  -0.7  19.1  18.9  -0.2
-Ghaa-.  9.0  12.5  3.5  -8.5  12.1  ,  3.8  -01
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Table XVI: Control GrouI  I-  Dependent Variable:  PCGROW90-PCGROW8O-C_PCGROW90+C_PCGROWSO
Eq.1  Eq2  Eq.3  Eq.4  E9.5  ES.6  Eq.7  Eq.8  Eq.9
c  -1.526  -1.153  -1.388  -1.646  -1.576  -1.063  -1.029  -0.969  -1.098
0.0W2  102  0.002  Q.001  0  0.01  0.035  0.066  0.12
PCGROW80C-PCGROW90  -0.371  -0.341  -0.328  -0.335  -0.317  -0.344  -0.320  -0.306  -0.314
0oo2  00w4  0.07  0aw  0.004  0.007  0.012  0.006  n01
INV8O-C-INVO  0.057  0.072  0.045  0.044  0.023  0.039  0.042  0.029  0.045
0.1SO  0.064  0228  a193  0.43  0218  0.187  0.318  Q136
SE90-SEeoC_SE90OCSE80  0.046  0.043  0.046  0.047  0.040  0.030  0.028  0.018  0.031
0.17  0013  aos2  0o12  0.092  0.069  n070  0.204  a119
GC904GCIO-c_GC90SC_GC8O  -0.155







(rAX90-TAX8  C-TAX90+CjTAX80)(GDPaO-ARGE)  0.077
0.237
(TAX90-TAXSO-C-TAX90OC_TAXO)(t  GDP10-LARGE)  0.001
a097s
(GC90CS0-C.GC90SC.GCSaOTAX90-TAX00  C_cAXSOCTAX5O)  -0.100
((GC90.GC8C.GC9O-C.AC8DPTAXSOTAX8D  CATAX9O.C..XAXBO)P80ULARGE  -0.112
0079
((GC9D4C8DC.GC90_G  GCaHTAX9O.TAX8DC.TAX#0C.TAXaO)r(1-GDPU.jLARGE)  -0.073
a 120
((GC90 GC08  GOC  GCiO0  TAXOO-'  AX8OC  CTAX9O.C  TAX8O)TEXP(G0V5-C  GOV5)  -0.005
Qs27








TAR9o0TARSO-CTARso+c_TARSO  -0.008  -0.019  -0.013  -0.006  -0.009  -0.012  -0.009  -0.002  -0.010
0487  a  186  0310  Q615  aS1 1  a486  O589  0.871  aS01
t2GoP9O-M2GDP80.C.M2GDP9o+C.M2DPU)  -0.644  -0.590  -0.614  -0.674  -0.665  -0.626  -0.645  -0.647  0.653
0060  a 164  0.000  0.09  0  0.000  0o.oo  0  n0ooo  Q0000
R-squared  0.913  0.905  0.910  0.905  0.897  0.883  0.886  0.898  0.887
Adjusted R-Squared  0.883  0.872  0.875  0.877  0.866  0.853  0.857  0.871  0.853
S.E of  egresion  0.778  0.814  0.804  0.800  0.834  0.873  0.862  0.817  0.873
Sum squared resid  17.546  19.224  18.117  19.192  20.847  23.629  23.020  20.688  22.888
Log likelihood  -40.276  -42.103  -40.917  -42.069  -43.724  -46.230  -45.707  -43.571  -45.593
Durbin-Watson  tat  1.597  2.097  1.967  1.746  1.885  2.006  1.943  2.226  1.967
*Countrieswit:changein  lG-TAX  greoter  atn 5% ponts (average 1990-99 compared to 198009); orwth trade taxes  >.  30% in  1990-99: TrO. CAM. HUN. OMN. BRZ CIV, GIN, MUS, SLE and GHARelative Returns to Policy Reforrn  (Castro,  Goldin and Pereira da Silva) DRAFT
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